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I. LEGAL AND REGULATORY IMPROVEMENTS TO ARBITRAL ETHICS 
 
1. Arbitrator's commitment to ethical values  
 
1. Throughout his long professional career, Bernardo Cremades has amply demon-
strated great diligence in the discharge of his arbitral duty, including his scrupulous 
respect for the principles of independence and impartiality which are the essence of his 
calling991. In addition to his outstanding work as an international arbitrator, Spain 
should be proud to have a jurist who, from the desert of the 1953 “anti-arbitration” law 
has energetically promoted in Spain the consolidation of this mechanism for resolving 
conflicts. I have had the good fortune to actively witness this impressive endeavour 
over several decades. May this paper, therefore, be a heartfelt tribute to a great Spanish 
master whose excellence in the field of arbitration has made him a universally re-
spected figure. 
The essential duty of an arbitrator is to facilitate dialogue between the parties, mak-
ing it possible to reach an agreement by both individualising litigious issues and arriv-
ing at a fair solution based on the understanding that the ethical duties of an arbitrator 
start from the moment he accepts the appointment and persist throughout each stage of 
the arbitration process. 
A good arbitrator is one who imposes his ethical values, fully aware that this will af-
fect his reputation and that his professional future will be benefited by conducting him-
self according to these values and not bending to the demands of a particular case. For 
this reason, professional ethical standards, as moral principles, acquire particular rele-
vance in services performed by arbitrators992. It is no coincidence that professional 
                                                 
991 Cass civ. March 16, 1999, Rev. arb., 1999, pp. 193 et seq. note M. Henry, “Les obligations 
d’indépendance et d’information de l’arbitre à la lumière de la jurisprudence récente”.  
992 F. N. Andrighi, “A ética como pilar de segurança da arbitragem”, Revista de Doutrina e Jurisprudência 
(Brasilia), nº 53, 1997, pp. 24-26; S.M. Ferreira Lemes, Princípios da independencia e da imparticialidade, São 
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arbitration associations are particularly concerned with establishing ethical principles 
to serve as guidelines for arbitration activity993.  
 
2. The differences between impartiality, independence and neutrality, because of 
their indeterminate and ambiguous nature, have given rise to long and sterile dogmatic 
debates which have often been a smoke screen to conceal their real meaning in the 
opinion of arbitrators994. In fact, impartiality and independence are actually two sides 
of the same coin: what matters is that both concepts describe a general expectation of 
the parties that their arbitral tribunal will be neutral as between the parties in 
performing its duties. Neutrality mainly relates to party appointed arbitrators who may 
be predisposed in favour of the party appointing them, although this circumstance must 
not prevail over their professional judgement if they consider that the other party is 
right995.  
In Rostock Poyectos, S.L. / Técnicas Reunidas, S.A. the Provincial Court of Madrid 
stated the following: 
 
“It has generally been understood that independence is an objective concept detected in the relation-
ship between the arbitrator and the parties, while impartiality seems to be a necessarily subjective atti-
tude to the situation of conflict on the part of the arbitrator. This should be understood fundamentally as 
an essential ethical duty of the arbitrator. Independence depends on past or present relationships with 
the parties that can be catalogued and verified, while impartiality is a mental attitude and, as such, 
harder to evaluate. However, the requirement of independence does not in itself guarantee the imparti-
ality of the arbitrator, as even an independent arbitrator can be partial”996. 
 
These notions have often been approached from a notably jurisdictional angle997, and 
this should be abandoned in favour of emphasising the characteristics of arbitration 
                                                                                                                                  
Paulo, LTr, 2001; H. Gabriel and A.H. Raymond, “Ethic for Commercial Arbitrators: Basic Principles and 
Emerging Standards”, Wyoming L. Rev., vol. 5, nº 2, 2005, pp. 453-470; R. Mullerat Balmaña, “Ethical Rules for 
Arbitrators”, Anuario de Justicia Alternativa, nº 6, 2005, pp. 77-117; C.A. Rogers, “The Ethic of International 
Arbitrators”, The Leading Arbitrators’ Guide to International Arbitration (L.W. Newman and R.D. Hill, eds.), 
2nd ed., Juris Publishing, 2008 (Chap. 28); P. Mitchard, “Ethics in European Arbitration”, The European & 
Middle Eastern Arbitration Review, 2009. http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/reviews/14/sections/53/ 
chapters/509/ethics-european-arbitration/. 
993 See B.M. Cremades, “Nuevo Código ético para los árbitros internacionales”, Revista de la Corte Españo-
la de Arbitraje (RCEA), vol. IV, 1987, pp. 9-14.  
994 X. de Mello, “Réflexion sur les règles déontologiques élaborées par l’International Bar association pour 
les arbitres internationaux”, Rev. arb., 1988, pp. 339-348. P. Lalive, “Rapport de synthèse”, La procédure 
arbitrale et l’indépendance des arbitres, ICC Publications nº 472, 1991, p. 59. 
995 A. Redfern and M. Hunter (with N. Blackaby and C. Partasides), Law and Practice of International 
Commercial Arbitration, 4nd éd, London, Sweet&Maxwell, 2004, nº 4-54 and 4-46. 
996 AP Madrid, Juin 13, 2007, Arbitraje. Revista de Arbitraje Comercial y de Inversiones (Arbitraje), vol. I, 
nº 2, 2008, p. 547 et seq. note E. Vallindes García. 
997 From the judge’s perspective see, inter alia: V. Angiolini, “Independenza della magistratura e verifiche di 
professionalità”, Questione Giustiza, 2000, nº 2, 315-329; P. Fernández-Viagas Bartolomé, El Juez imparcial, 
Granada, Comares, 1997; P. González Granda, Independencia del juez y control de su actividad, Valencia, 
Tirant Lo Blanch, 1993; R. Jiménez Asensio, Imparcialidad judicial y derecho al juez imparcial, Pamplona, 
Aranzadi, 2002; G. Masson, Les juges et le pouvoir, Paris, A. Moreau, 1977; J. Montero Aroca, Independencia y 
responsabilidad del juez, Madrid, Civitas, 1990; J.L. Requejo Pagés, Jurisdicción e independencia judicial, 
Madrid, CEC, 1989; R. Rodríguez Fernández, La contaminación procesal: El derecho al juez imparcial. Causas 
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itself, because the role of arbitrator, in contrast with that of a jurist, revolves around the 
wishes of the parties. Arbitrators are not judges998. Indeed, it is inconceivable that the 
laws of arbitration could establish formulas to guarantee the independence of arbitra-
tors in the same way as those established for judges in jurisdictional rules. Neither is it 
possible to accept, however, that the notion of “impartiality” can only be applied to the 
judiciary999. However, there are several important similarities between the two roles, as 
the Sentence of the Provincial Court of Madrid of July 28, 2005 highlighted, 
 
“[T]he requirement of the right to an impartial judge chosen by Law cannot be imposed exactly and 
precisely on arbitrators and arbitration service providers; the right to an impartial judge chosen by law 
involves a number of connotations derived from the limits of political power and the permanence of es-
sential guarantees for citizens, which is not the case in other forms of justice. Nevertheless, if there is 
one thing that characterises arbitration, as a private, adjudicative body, it is the requirement of imparti-
ality, a requirement that should be extended to all those taking part in arbitration activities; both arbitra-
tors and arbitration service providers”1000. 
 
The Spanish Constitutional Court has confirmed the subjective right of parties 
presenting their disputes to the impartiality of an arbitrator, and that the conduct of 
arbitral proceedings should not be detrimental to their right to a fair hearing, being a 
right derived from the legal configuration of arbitration itself as an adjudicative ap-
proach to conflicts. Nevertheless, it considers that this right is specifically implemented 
in the sphere of ordinary legal practice, its protection being applied exclusively through 
the decision to vacate awards1001. 
 
2. Ethical standards imposed by law and by arbitration centres 
 
3. The ethical obligations to which arbitrators are subject, according to most arbitra-
tion legislation, and the regulations established by leading arbitration service providers 
are based on the aforementioned basic principles of impartiality and independence 
with, in some cases, the addition of neutrality. Although, prima facie, impartiality and 
independence are fundamental and necessary guarantees to ensure correct administra-
tion of justice, they should also be taken as guarantees for those seeking justice, i.e., as 
a right to be heard by an independent and impartial court. Article 12 of Uncitral Model 
Law (1985) establishes the arbitrator’s duty to remain independent and impartial dur-
ing the arbitration process, a circumstance referred to in Article 17(1) of the Spanish 
Arbitration Act (2003). This duty starts from the moment the arbitrator is appointed 
and ends, barring termination in exceptional circumstances pursuant to Article 38(2), 
with the final award or, if applicable, the corresponding decision to request clarifica-
                                                                                                                                  
de abstención y recusación, Granada, Comares 2000; D. Simon, La independencia del juez, Barcelona, Ariel, 
1985; R. Stevens, The Independence of the Judiciary: the View from the Lord Chanceller’s Office, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1993. 
998 H. Gabriel and A.H. Raymond, “Ethic for Commercial Arbitrators...”, loc. cit., p. 453. 
999 J.Mª Ruiz Moreno, “Nombramiento y aceptación de los árbitros. Imparcialidad, recusación y abstención”, 
Estudios sobre arbitraje. Los temas clave (J.L. González Montes, coord.), Madrid, La Ley, 2008, pp. 73-112, 
esp. p. 97. 
1000 JUR 2005\237326. 
1001 Spanish Constitutional Court, 9/2005, January 17, 2005. 
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tion or correction or to issue a supplement to the award (Articles 38(1) and 39)1002. This 
conclusion, however, does not exempt arbitrators from their ethical commitment to 
arbitration. What it does involve is leaving a reasonable period of time before resuming 
personal, professional or commercial relations with parties, and abstaining from help-
ing the losing party prepare their motion for setting aside the award. 
 
4. The rules of arbitral institutions usually include the ethical principles of impartial-
ity and independence in order to ensure that the appointed arbitrator is qualified to rule 
on the conflict heard before him fairly and impartially1003. Nevertheless, the scope of 
these duties is different, giving rise to enormous variations which can often determine 
the choice of a particular service provider if these issues are not carefully regulated. An 
arbitrator may have no problem providing his services to one institution, and yet be 
rejected by another. With regard to regulations, a difference should be made between 
those which come from outside a particular arbitration service provider and those de-
signed to comply with a particular institutional strategy, which evidently include a pre-
established series of interests1004.  
 
i) Among the latter, we must refer to the Unictral Arbitration Rules (1976) which, in 
Article 9, establish that “(A) prospective arbitrator shall disclose to those who ap-
proach him in connection with his possible appointment any circumstances likely to 
give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or independence. An arbitrator, once 
appointed or chosen, shall disclose such circumstances to the parties unless they have 
already been informed by him of these circumstances”.  
 
ii) Among the former we would refer to the provisions of the rules of leading arbi-
tration institutions: Article 5(2) of the LCIA Arbitration Rules (1998)1005, Article 14.1 
of the ICSID Convention (1965)1006, or the AAA International Dispute Resolution Pro-
cedures (2009), which, in addition to establishing in Article 7 that “Arbitrators acting 
under these Rules shall be impartial and independent”, in Section 2 state that:  
 
                                                 
1002 This Law currently in force eliminates the reference, with regard to challenges, in Article 17 of the old 
Arbitration Act/1988 to the same grounds as those applied to judges, reasoning that these are not always appro-
priate to arbitration and cannot be applied in all cases opting, therefore, for a general clause (Statement of Pur-
poses IV). 
1003 An analysis of arbitration based on the rules imposed by arbitration institutions and national regulations, 
with particular regard to Mexican law, can be found in the study conducted by F. González de Cossío, “Inde-
pendencia, imparcialidad y apariencia de imparcialidad de los árbitros”, Jurídica, Revista del Departamento de 
Derecho de la Universidad Iberoamericana, nº 32, 2002, pp. 459-479. 
1004 T. Giovannini, “Arbitres et institutions d’arbitrage: conflits d’intérêts”, Rev. dr. aff. int., 2002, nº 6, pp. 
629-641. 
1005 “All arbitrators conducting an arbitration under these Rules shall be and remain at all times impartial and 
independent of the parties; and none shall act in the arbitration as advocates for any party. No arbitrator, whether 
before or after appointment, shall advise any party on the merits or outcome of the dispute”. 
1006 “Persons designated to serve on the Panels shall be persons of high moral character and recognized com-
petence in the fields of law, commerce, industry or finance, who may be relied upon to exercise independent 
judgment. Competence in the field of law shall be of particular importance in the case of persons on the Panel of 
Arbitrators”. 
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“No party or anyone acting on its behalf shall have any ex parte communication relating to the case 
with any arbitrator, or with any candidate for appointment as party–appointed arbitrator except to ad-
vise the candidate of the general nature of the controversy and of the anticipated proceedings and to 
discuss the candidate's qualifications, availability or independence in relation to the parties, or to dis-
cuss the suitability of candidates for selection as a third arbitrator where the parties or party designated 
arbitrators are to participate in that selection. No party or anyone acting on its behalf shall have any ex 
parte communication relating to the case with any candidate for presiding arbitrator”.  
 
The ICC Rules of Arbitration (1998) provide a professional description strongly focus-
sed on the external dimension, e.g., on the independence of the arbitrator - Article 7(1); 
because of this, before confirming the appointment proposed by one party, the prospec-
tive arbitrator must sign a statement of independence1007 in which he must disclose any 
reasons why this independence may be called into question; if the opposite party calls 
into question the independence of the arbitrator, the Court has the final word on 
whether or not the persons nominated by the parties are confirmed in their appointment 
- Article 9(2). Note that “impartiality” is not used as an objective concept alluding, 
generally speaking, to a state of mind which at times can be extremely difficult to as-
certain when appointing an arbitrator. In contrast to US, English and Swedish arbitra-
tion laws, which prefer to use the concept of “impartiality”, the ICC deliberately 
chooses to limit its rules to the concept of “independence” 1008.  
 
3. Code of ethics for arbitrators 
 
5. Internationally renowned arbitration centres, in addition to leading international 
lawyers' associations, consider that arbitrators take on grave responsibilities, which 
include important ethical duties both to the public and the parties involved. These insti-
tutions have set the trend by asserting that ethics is particularly relevant not only for 
the parties involved in the arbitration, but also for society as a whole. The aim is to 
preserve the value of confidence in human intercourse, which enables commercial, 
cultural, etc. exchange to develop smoothly.  
In view of the conduct of arbitration and the abuse of the same perpetrated by cer-
tain agents, it seems increasingly advisable to establish a code of ethics for arbitra-
tors1009. It is common practice for arbitration institutions to insert in their own regula-
tions a series of rules regarding this issue, draw up their own code of ethics1010 or ad-
                                                 
1007 “(W)hether there exists any past or present relationship, direct or indirect, between you and any of the 
parties, their related entities or their lawyers or other representatives, whether financial, professional or of any 
other kind. Any doubt must be resolved in favour of disclosure. Any disclosure should be complete and specific, 
identifying inter alia relevant dates (both start and end dates), financial arrangements, details of companies and 
individuals, and all other relevant information”. See R.S. Bond, “The Selection of ICC Arbitrators and the Re-
quirement of Independence”, Arb. Int’l, vol. 4, 1988, pp. 300 ss. 
1008 Article 11(1). See the justification of this attitude in Y. Derains and E.A. Schwarzt, A Guide to the ICC 
Rules of Arbitration, 2nd éd, La Haya, Kluwer Law International, 2005, ch. 4. 
1009 V.V. Veeder, “Is there any Need for a Code of Ethics for International Commercial Arbitrators?”, Les 
arbitres internationaux: Colloque du 4 février 2005, Paris, Centre Français de Droit Comparé, 8, 2005, pp. 187-
194. 
1010 E.g. the code of ethics of the Society of Maritime Arbitrators, Inc. Nevertheless, regulations of this kind 
are usually very broad-based and do not generally enter into the details of individual cases and therefore always 
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here to a code of conduct drawn up by a professional or bar association with enabled to 
provide arbitration services1011. In the case of the latter there are important contribu-
tions such as the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, 
the AAA–ABA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes, or in Spain, 
the Recommendations on the Independence and Impartiality of Arbitrators Issued by 
the Spanish Arbitration Club.  
 
6. The aim of the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, 
the latest version of which was approved in May 2004, thanks to the combined efforts of 
the ABA and the AAA1012, is to help parties, lawyers, arbitrators and arbitration institu-
tions on such relevant issues as impartiality and independence and other ethical arbitra-
tion duties including disclosure, communication, diligence, and confidentiality. The 
widespread acceptance of the IBA Rules of Ethics has played a decisive role in bringing 
global arbitration into line. The rules had a significant impact on the provisions adopted 
by the ICC in 1988 regarding the acceptance of arbitrators and compliance with the duty 
to inform in the event of a conflict of interests arising that could cast doubt on independ-
ence, neutrality or impartiality1013. Such texts carry a number of conduct guidelines 
aimed at achieving a just and effective ruling on the conflict, even though compliance, 
either by the parties or the arbitrators, is not compulsory unless a specific undertaking in 
this regard is reached1014. Based on these guidelines, the arbitrator has a threefold duty to 
perform: first, to the parties; second, to other arbitrators; and third, to the arbitration ser-
vice provider. In the first case, the arbitrator must act with extreme caution to avoid the 
slightest doubt being cast on his impartiality and independence. The fact that at times 
arbitrators are appointed by one or other of the parties does not imply any link to that 
party, and the arbitrator must maintain the prescribed composure in dealings with both 
parties, to this end addressing both parties in a correct and polite way both during and 
outside the process1015. In the second case, the arbitrator must establish cordial relations 
with his colleagues, showing them respect and solidarity and avoid discrediting the 
known actions of other arbitrators in other proceedings. Finally, with regard to the arbi-
tration service provider, the arbitrator must help to develop the quality of the arbitration 
services provided, defending the standards of quality demanded and obeying the institu-
tional rules and ethics. 
                                                                                                                                  
require prior interpretation. Certain institutions concerned with international commercial transactions have seen 
that progress must be made in the process of bringing international ethics for arbitrators into line. 
1011 C.A. Rogers, “Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of Conduct for International Arbitra-
tion”, Michigan J. Int’l L., vol. 23, 2003, pp. 341 ss. 
1012 In 1956 it drew up a code of ethics for arbitrators acting in international disputes; this was substantially 
modified in 1987, and again in 2004. See Business Law International at BLI, vol. 5, nº 3, 2004, pp. 433-458; 
B.M. Cremades y W.L. Cairns, “El arbitraje en la encrucijada entre la globalización y sus detractores”, RCEA, 
vol. XVII, 2002, pp. 15-61 (31); Ph. Landolt, “The IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International 
Arbitration: An Overview”, J. Int’l Arb., vol. 22, nº 5, 2005, pp. 409-418. 
1013 E. Helmer, “International Commercial Arbitration, Americanized, Civilized or Harmonized”, Ohio State 
Journal on Dispute Resolution, vol. 19, 2003, pp. 35-67. 
1014 See B.H. Sheppard, “A New Era of Arbitrator Ethics for the United States The 2004 Revision to the 
AAA/ABA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes”, Arb. Int’l, vol. 21, nº 1, 2006, pp. 91 et seq. 
1015 See infra nº 33-34. 
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7. The American Bar Association and the American Arbitration Association realized 
that it would be in the public interest to draft generally accepted rules of ethical behaviour 
to guide arbitrators and parties involved in commercial disputes, and to this end published 
in 1977 the AAA–ABA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes1016, revised 
in 20041017, confident that this would help maintain high standards and safeguard the trust 
placed in arbitration proceedings. Even though in practice there are not a significant num-
ber of cases involving lack of ethics on the part of commercial arbitrators, it is always use-
ful to have a code that establishes generally accepted ethical standards designed to guide 
arbitrators and parties in commercial disputes in the hope of helping maintain high stan-
dards and confidence in the process of arbitration. In this regard it simply included gener-
ally accepted ethical standards to guide arbitrators and parties in commercial conflicts in 
order to consolidate confidence in arbitration itself, and to this end established the funda-
mental duty of the arbitrator to preserve the integrity and justice of the arbitration process. 
To this end it presumes that all arbitrators are neutral or, better still, independent and impar-
tial, in compliance with the rules of arbitration agreed by the parties and any applicable 
laws; on these grounds it demands that all arbitrators appointed by the parties declare, at the 
earliest possible opportunity, whether or not they are neutral. According to these provi-
sions, arbitrators are not in breach of the rule of neutrality if, by virtue of their experience 
or expertise, they express in scientific journals or the popular press, for example, opinions 
on certain general issues which would probably arise in the proceeding to which they are 
appointed. 
 
8. The Spanish Arbitration Club was founded in 2005 with the main aim of promot-
ing arbitration as a means of resolving conflicts, furthering Spain's position as an inter-
national centre for arbitration and developing arbitration in the Latin American arena. 
Among other activities, the Club has paid particular attention to issues surrounding the 
ethics of arbitrators, leading to the publication of the Recommendations on the Inde-
pendence and Impartiality of Arbitrators (2008)1018, aimed at ensuring that users of 
arbitration, arbitrators, and the judges and courts that have to apply the Spanish Arbi-
tration Act (2003), distinguish between circumstances requiring disclosure and those 
allowing challenge. These Recommendations constitute an important basis for the 
practice of arbitration in Spain, although it can be seen from their content that the 
sphere of action of arbitrators, from an ethical point of view, is much greater than that 
contemplated in the regulations discussed above1019.  
 
II. ETHICAL ELEMENTS OF ACCESS TO ARBITRATION 
 
                                                 
1016 R. Coulson, “An American Critique of the IBA’s Ethic for International Arbitrators”, J. Int’l. Arb., vol. 4, 
nº 2, 1987, pp. 103 ss. 
1017 http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/ResourcesforArbitratorsandMediators/p009525. See B. May-
erson and J.M. Townsend, “Revised Code of Ethics for Commercial Arbitrators Explained”, Disp. Res. J., vol. 
59, nº 1, 2004, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3923/is_200402/ai_n9392136. 
1018 http://www.clubarbitraje.com/files/docs/recomendacion_independencia_arbitral_eng.pdf. 
1019 See S. Álvarez González, Arbitraje, vol. II, nº 1, 2009, pp. 273-276 (275). 
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1. Disclosure of Conflicts of Interest 
 
9. One of the most important mechanisms that help ensure full compliance with the 
principles of independence and impartiality in arbitration is the disclosure of conflicts of 
interest1020. Legislation1021 and the rules of arbitration, generally stricter1022, establish the 
principle of law pursuant to which the arbitrator shall disclose any circumstances likely to 
give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or independence and shall do so without 
delay. The arbitrator also has a duty to disclose any past relationships with parties that may 
raise questions of bias1023. The guideline is laid out in Article 12(1) of the Uncitral Model 
Law (1985): “When a person is approached in connection with his possible appointment as 
an arbitrator, he shall disclose any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as 
to his impartiality or independence. An arbitrator, from the time of his appointment and 
throughout the arbitral proceedings, shall without delay disclose any such circumstances to 
the parties unless they have already been informed of them by him”. Here we have an obli-
gation which is presented as a fundamental principle of arbitration both on a domestic and 
international scale, and which is a direct consequence of the overall principle of good faith. 
In each case, arbitrators have sufficient elements to determine what issues should be re-
vealed to the parties so that they can decide whether or not they really affect their impartial-
ity and independence, and in which cases they should abstain. Thus, disclosure has been 
described as the arbitration body's real “life insurance policy” 1024. Failure to comply can 
result in three sanctions: (1) setting aside the arbitration award, (2) challenge, and (3) 
liability for the arbitrator1025. The principle is subject to some variation depending on dif-
ferent state systems. 
 
10. In the U.S.A. there is a positive duty on arbitrators to investigate possible conflicts of 
interest, distinguishing between relationships likely to affect arbitrator’s judgment and 
                                                 
1020 L. Shore, “Disclosure and Impartiality: An Arbitrator’s Responsibility vis-a-vis Legal Standards”, Disp. 
Res. J., 2002. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3923/is_200202/ai_n9069935/. 
1021 In the case of Switzerland, compliance is established as a legal decision. Subsequently, the LDIP pro-
vided in Article 180 that “An arbitrator may be challenged: (…) c. If circumstances exist that give rise to justifi-
able doubts as to his independence”. In the United States, claims against arbitrators for failure to disclose conflict 
of interest do not result in any loss of arbitral immunity. Under Section 14(c) of the Revised Uniform Arbitration 
Act 2000, an arbitrator’s failure to make a disclosure required by Section 12 dues not cause any loss of immunity 
under this section; the typical remedy for a failure to disclose of interest is vacatur under Section 23 of the act. 
1022 AAA-ABA Code of Ethics, Canon II; IBA Guidelines, General Standard 2(b). The 2006 review of the 
ICSID Rules and Regulation was intended to increase guarantees concerning the independence and impartiality 
of arbitrators. In the statement that must be signed by all arbitrators when the court in convened, rule 6 includes 
the requirement that arbitrators must declare any circumstances which may lead one party to question their 
confidence in the impartial judgement of the arbitrator. See note I. Iruretagoiena Agirrezabalaga, Arbitraje, vol. 
I, nº 1, 2008, pp. 284-285. 
1023 A.K. Hoffmann, “Duty of Disclosure and Challenge of Arbitrators: the Standard Applicable under the 
New IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interests and the German Approach”, Arb. Int’l, vol. 21, nº 3, 2005, pp. 
427-436. 
1024 Th. Clay, L’arbitre, París, Dalloz, 2001, p. 318. 
1025 Ch. Seraglini, Droit du commerce international (J. Béguin y M. Menjuncq, dirs.), Paris, Litec, 2005, pp. 
980-988; Ph. Fouchard, “Le statut de l’arbitre dans la jurisprudence française”, Rev. arb., 1996, pp. 325-372 
(364). 
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relationships that are merely “trivial”1026. Judge Posner, in the Seventh Circuit’s decision, 
Merit Insurance Co. v. Leatherby Insurance Co., found: “the test in this case is not whether 
the relationship was trivial; it is whether, having due regard for the different expectations 
regarding impartiality that parties bring to arbitration than to litigation, the relationship 
between Clifford and Stern was so intimate—personally, socially, professionally, or finan-
cially—as to cast serious doubt on Clifford’s impartiality”1027. In Commonwealth Coatings, 
one arbitrator on a panel of three failed to disclose that he had engaged in periodic and 
significant business relationships with one of the parties to the arbitration over the previous 
five or six years1028. The ruling in question is important because even though the arbitrator 
accredited that there were insufficient grounds for determining lack of independence or 
impartiality, the Supreme Court ruled that he had failed to comply with his obligation of 
disclosure. Since then, several federal courts have derived a variety of standards, some 
stricter than others, to determine whether a failure to disclose a relationship or conflict 
constitutes “evident partiality”.  
In Schmitz v. Zilveti, the Court vacated an arbitration award where the arbitrator’s law 
firm had extensively represented the parent company of an entity involved in the arbitration 
and the arbitrator had run conflict check only on the subsidiary entity. The case arose under 
the National Association of Securities Dealers Rules, which specifically require the inves-
tigation of possible conflicts of interest. In that case, the Ninth Circuit found evident parti-
ality where an arbitrator, who was also an attorney, did not investigate potential conflicts or 
disclose that his firm had performed legal work for one of the parties’ corporate parents1029. 
Another court interpreting Schmitz suggests that a lawyer may have an independent duty to 
investigate conflicts in a potential arbitration by virtue of the lawyer’s duty to run conflict 
checks before representing new clients1030. Other courts have declined to find such a gener-
alized duty for attorney-arbitrators, and have held that conflicts of which the arbitrator was 
unaware, or which are marginal, do not constitute evident partiality such that vacatur of the 
award is appropriate1031.  
 
11. In French law the obligation to disclose has its own provision in Article 1452(2) 
NCPC (“The arbitrator who shall consider himself open to being recused shall inform the 
parties. In that case, he may only agree to his assignment under the approval of the par-
ties”). This precept is doubly subjective, in the sense that the arbitrator must reveal what he 
                                                 
1026 A.R. Robertson and L.M. Brennan, “The Law on Overturning Arbitration Awards for Partiality Is Con-
fused”, The Committee on Commercial & Business Litigation, vol. 10, nº 3, 2009 
http://www.cpradr.org/DesktopModules/iBN%20News%20Articles/Download.aspx?AttachmentID=147. 
1027 714 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1983). http://openjurist.org/714/f2d/673. 
1028 Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas., 393 U.S. 145, 151-52 (89 S.Ct. 337, 21 L.Ed.2d 
301) (1968), http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=393&invol=145. 
1029 Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 1994). http://cases.justia.com/us-court-of-
appeals/F3/20/1043/523107/. 
1030 HSMV Corp. v. ADI Ltd., 72 F.Supp.2d 1122 (C.D. Cal. 1999). 
1031 In Al-Harbi v. Citibank, 85 F.3d 680 (D.C. Cir. 1996), the arbitrator had failed to disclose that his former 
law firm had represented one of the parties in matters unrelated to the underlying dispute. 
http://openjurist.org/85/f3d/680/al-harbi-v-citibank-na-as. See T. Weiner, “Recent Decisions of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit: Arbitration”, George Washington L. Rev., vol. 65, 1997, 
pp. 616 et seq. 
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thinks could be construed by the parties as grounds for a challenge, which calls for the 
arbitrator to engage in a “deliberation which tends to objectivise the situation” 1032. The 
Paris Court of Appeal has on various occasions reiterated that independence is a fundamen-
tal part of the jurisdictional role of arbitrators as a result of their role as a judges vis–à–vis 
the parties to the arbitration. According to the Court, the arbitrator's duty to inform in order 
to allow the parties to exercise their rights to challenge, must be assessed both with respect 
to the notoriety of the contested situation and with its effect on the arbitrator's judge-
ment1033. French jurisprudence is rife with examples of sanctions imposed for breach of the 
obligation to inform.  
 
12. Article 17(2) of the Spanish Arbitration Act (2003) echoes the meaning of Article 
12(1) of the Uncitral Model Law, presenting it as an obligation to be complied with by the 
arbitrator before accepting the appointment. Rule 11(1) of the recommendations of Spanish 
Arbitration Club also establishes that arbitrators must “disclose any circumstances that 
could give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or independence (“Circumstances 
of Disclosure”). Good faith and the duty of transparency require candidates to disclose any 
circumstances that could, potentially, from the parties’ standpoint, give rise to doubts as to 
their independence and impartiality”1034. Spanish practice maintains this position. In Skoda 
Power, S.A. / Abener Energia–El Sauz, S.A. of C.V. the Provincial Court of Madrid stated 
that the arbitrator should, in compliance with his  
 
“... duty to impartiality and independence, reveal to the parties and to the Court's secretariat any facts or cir-
cumstances arising during the arbitration proceedings that could affect said independence or impartiality, call-
ing for an analysis of the extent of the arbitrator's the duty to inform or disclose, being obliged, if applicable, 
to communicate any circumstance that could give rise to justified doubts regarding said impartiality, doubts 
that could arise in the arbitrator not only from a subjective point of view, but also from an objective point of 
view, and which could lead the parties to call into question said impartiality or independence”1035. 
 
13. In arbitration clauses opting for ad hoc arbitration one rarely find negative guidelines 
establishing impediments and obligations applied to the arbitrator to prevent conflictive 
situations, above all those that are not clearly taken to be grounds for implication or chal-
lenge. The possibility, however, of establishing in the arbitration agreement, or in institu-
tional arbitration rules, that arbitrators must submit a signed statement of interests as a 
guarantee of their professional suitability to serve, cannot be ruled out. The truth is that the 
obligation we shall analyse is fully effective in institutional arbitration due to the existence 
of an arbitration center capable of acting as a controlling body due to its empowerment to 
decide on any challenge arising. This has even been claimed to be one of the main virtues 
of institutional arbitration. Together with the aim of preserving the prestige of the arbitra-
tion service provider the aforementioned control would aim to prevent, as far as possible, 
                                                 
1032 See Ph. Fouchard, “Le statut de l’arbitre... ”, pp. 347-348. 
1033 Inter alia, CA Paris (1re Ch. suppl), June 2, 1989 (Société Gemanco / S.A.E.P.A. et S.I.A.P.E.), June, 28, 
1991 (KFTCIC / Icori Estero) and June 30, 1995 (B / Société Annahold BV et autres), Rev. arb., 1991, pp. 87 et 
seq.; 1992, pp. 568 et seq. note P. Bellet and 1996, pp. 496-502. 
1034 See Rule 11(2) Rules of Court of Arbitration of the Madrid Chamber of Commerce (2009), Arbitraje, 
vol. II, nº 3, 2009, p. 909. 
1035 AP Madrid, May 5, 2008, Arbitraje, vol. II, nº 2, 2009, pp. 554 et seq. note C. Martín Brañas. 
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any possible claim for damages arising from civil suits brought on the grounds of arbitral 
negligence, above all in certain arbitration systems increasingly exposed to these issues.  
It is obvious that if it is indispensable to approach a judge to appoint arbitrators, national 
laws could facilitate the judge's decision, essential for setting arbitration in motion, by not 
including special circumstances that could allow parties to bring delaying tactics to bear 
which could jeopardize the arbitration process itself, and become a cancer on the same1036. 
From this, one could infer that the arbitrator's duty of diligence is the best antidote to counter-
act the bad will of a party intending to delay the process. This is the case with legislation that 
includes objective criteria such as the independence of the arbitrator which could give rise to 
forced challenges based on the apparent impartiality of the arbitrator1037. 
 
14. The parties to arbitration, duly informed, take control, as arbitrators may issue incom-
plete, ambiguous or erroneous statements in detriment to the self-imposed thoroughness and 
strictness when dictating their statement of independence1038. Arbitrators are under the obli-
gation to reveal to the parties any circumstance that could affect their decision and that could 
cause “dans l’esprit des parties un doute raisonnable sur ses qualités d’impartialité et 
d’indépendance, qui sont l’essence même de la fonction arbitrale” 1039, e.g., generic informa-
tion regarding a possible conflict of interests on the part of the president of the arbitral tribu-
nal who works for a company advising the controlling company of one of the parties to the 
conflict. Because of this, if the arbitrator reveals any circumstance that could affect his ac-
tions the parties must determine the issue, if they deem fit, within a short time limit, usually 
established by the rules of arbitration; if no grounds for abstention or challenge are presented 
before this deadline the arbitrator may freely exercise his duties.  
It is interesting, however, to emphasize the content of the statement, which must be clear 
enough to enable the parties to judge, from their own viewpoint, if it can be used as a basis 
for disqualifying the arbitrator even when the undisclosed facts or circumstances do not in 
themselves provide grounds for said disqualification. Here it is useful to remember the 
words of the opinion in Commonwealth Corp, where it was held to be better to make the 
relationship public from the start, when the parties, acquainted with the relationship, are at 
liberty to reject or accept the arbitrator. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that an 
arbitrator may have a number of commercial and personal relations. In light of this, an 
arbitrator cannot be expected “to provide the parties with his complete and unexpurgated 
business biography”, requiring that if the arbitrator “has done more than trivial business 
with a party, that fact must be disclosed”1040, to the point of arriving at such absurd situa-
tions as disclosing a passing encounter in the street. This releases the arbitrator from mak-
                                                 
1036 B.Mª Cremades, “El arbitraje comercial internacional en una economía globalizada”, Revista Jurídica 
Española La Ley, 1998, 5, D-233, pp. 1535-1537. 
1037 E. Gaillard, “Les manoeuvres dilatoires des parties et des arbitres dans l’arbitrage commercial internatio-
nal”, Rev. arb., 1990, pp. 759-796 (761); A. Fré, “Delaying Tactics in Arbitration”, Disp. Res. J., vol. 59, nº 4, 
2004-2005. 
1038 Th. Clay, L’arbitre, op. cit., nos 378-395. 
1039 CA Paris (1ère Ch. Sec. C) February 12, 2009, S.A. J&P Avax S.A. / Société Tecnimont SPA, Rev. arb., 
2009, pp. 186 et seq. note Th. Clay. 
1040 U.S. Supreme Court, Commonwealth Corp. v. Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968) 393 U.S. 145 (Mr. Jus-
tice White with whom Mr. Justice Marshall, joins, concurring). 
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ing a detailed statement, as long as the disclosure is sufficiently accurate and indicates the 
nature of the relationship (friendly, academic, professional, etc.) maintained by the arbitra-
tor with all those involved in the arbitration proceedings. 
Some of the issues that should be mentioned in the statement are, by way of example, 
business relationships which the arbitrator maintains, directly or indirectly, with either of 
the parties; academic relations; strong, on-going, social and professional relations that may 
arise between the arbitrator and either party; and business relations, either direct or indirect, 
with any of the corporations competing with either party. Any on-going, direct or indirect, 
business relationship arising between the arbitrator and either party, or between the arbitra-
tor and any person who might be called as a key witness in the case, will normally provide 
sufficient grounds for questioning the impartiality or independence of the proposed arbitra-
tor. Likewise, any other circumstance or fact that could provide justifiable grounds for the 
independence or impartiality of the arbitrator to be questioned should be revealed. The 
scope of the latter is particularly relevant when the appointed arbitrator belongs to a law 
firm involved in defending the interests of one of the parties, even if this takes place in a 
different country from where the proposed arbitration is to be held.  
 
15. As can be expected in arbitration rules, the arbitrator's duty to inform is usually thor-
oughly regulated. One only has to refer to Article 9 of the Uncitral Arbitration Rules (1976) 
which provides that: “A prospective arbitrator shall disclose to those who approach him in 
connection with his possible appointment any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable 
doubts as to his impartiality or independence. An arbitrator, once appointed or chosen, shall 
disclose such circumstances to the parties unless they have already been informed by him 
of these circumstances”. And Article 10, which adds that “any arbitrator may be challenged 
if circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or 
independence”, although it also adds the following temporal requirement: “a party may 
challenge the arbitrator appointed by him only for reasons of which he becomes aware after 
the appointment has been made”.  
Arbitration centers usually pay particular attention to statements made by arbitrators, 
making it compulsory for the appointed arbitrators to submit to the arbitration service pro-
vider a written declaration detailing the facts or circumstances which could, from the point 
of view of the parties, raise doubts about their independence. The institutions then relay 
said information to the parties, setting a time limit for the latter to make their opinion 
known. One only need cite the subjectivism evident in Articles 7(2) of the ICC Arbitration 
Rules: “Before appointment or confirmation, a prospective arbitrator shall sign a statement 
of independence and disclose in writing to the Secretariat any facts or circumstances which 
might be of such a nature as to call into question the arbitrator’s independence in the eyes 
of the parties. The Secretariat shall provide such information to the parties in writing and 
fix a time limit for any comments from them”. 
Aside from regulatory provisions, certain codes of ethics abound in references to the 
arbitrator's duty to inform. One such code which must be mentioned is that of the In-
ternational Bar Association (IBA), which establishes the different situations in which 
the conduct of the arbitrator could be seen as partial or biased. Cannon II of the AAA-
ABA ethical code deals with this issue at greater length, referring to the need to dis-
close any financial, commercial, professional, family or social relationship, past or 
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present, that the arbitrator may have with either party or their legal advisers or with any 
other person who they have been told could be called as a witness, and that could affect 
the impartiality of the arbitrator or that could give the appearance of one-sidedness; it 
is also compulsory to disclose any existing relationship that could compromise their 
family members or current employees, business or silent partners. By way of an exam-
ple from maritime arbitration we need only refer to n. 4 of the ethical code of the Soci-
ety of Maritime Arbitrators, Inc.:  
 
“Before accepting appointment an arbitrator may only inquire as to the general nature of the dispute and 
the names of the parties and their affiliates involved. A member shall not act as an Arbitrator in any proceed-
ing in which he, his associates, or his relatives have a financial interest, or where his association with either 
the parties, counsel or other Arbitrators may give rise to an inference of bias without making a full disclosure 
of the relationship. A member shall not participate in a proceeding in which he has allowed others to inform 
him of details of the case before him prior to the first hearing”. 
 
16. The duty to inform referred to here starts from the moment the arbitrator is appointed 
or proposed, and as such is not a one-off obligation but remains in force until the arbitration 
award is announced - for example, an arbitrator who is appointed to the bench of a consti-
tutional court, or an in-house lawyer belonging to a particular company. Compliance takes 
the form of a written statement of possible conflicts of interest.  
Said conflicts mainly involve current or past circumstances which could place the arbi-
trator in a position more favorable to one party, and this is why arbitration institutions de-
mand that, prior to their appointment, candidates fill out a series of ad hoc questionnaires 
designed to eliminate any shadow of doubt that may hang over said circumstances, above 
all in the case of international arbitration, where it is harder to specify any possible link 
between the arbitrator and the dispute. As mentioned above, this duty to disclose remains in 
force throughout the arbitration process, therefore, any communications between arbitrators 
and the parties or their lawyers must be immediately made known to the other parties and 
members of the arbitral tribunal. In fact, the appointed arbitrator must reveal any economic, 
commercial, professional, family or social relationship, past or present, which could affect 
his impartiality or which might reasonably create an appearance of partiality or bias. These 
relationships are not only confined to the parties and their lawyers, but to any person who 
might be called as a witness. Likewise, the arbitrator must disclose any relationship of this 
kind existing with any member of his family or with his current employees, partners or 
business partners.  
Common law systems are particularly sensitive to these issues, and it is better to err on 
the side of caution, above all during the stage at which the parties can accept or reject the 
arbitrator. 
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2. Requirement of transparency 
 
2.1. Impartiality 
 
17. Impartiality is an essential quality for any judge or arbitrator; however, the difficulty of 
providing objective proof makes it necessary to resort to objective situations1041. Arbitration 
assumes that arbitrators must maintain an equidistant position with respect to the positions of 
the parties expressed at the start of proceedings. As impartiality is a subjective issue, the crite-
ria used by third parties to view it are based on analyzing external facts through which impar-
tiality, or the absence of it, is usually manifest. Generally, said assessment is made from the 
perspective of an objective party with regard to the position of the party challenging the arbi-
trator. Impartiality must be absolute for all members of an arbitral tribunal, and no distinc-
tions can be made with respect to the standard of impartiality among the members of an arbi-
tral tribunal, whatever the procedure used for their appointment1042. 
This situation can only be verified in practice, e.g., ties with one of the parties can provide 
grounds for calling into question the principle of impartiality by which any arbitrator must 
abide to ensure a fair hearing1043. Modern arbitration laws are increasingly aware of the need 
to guarantee the premise we are analyzing, and international constraints applied to the regula-
tion of these issues can clearly be seen1045. The maximum effectiveness of said guarantee is 
applied when an award suspected of being biased is challenged1046; . It has also been claimed 
that any breach of the requirement of impartiality on the part of the arbitrator is a clear breach 
of public policy1047, or that it should be viewed from a “quasi-judicial” standpoint1048.  
Once arbitration is under way, biased conduct can be observed when the arbitrator, without 
providing arguments, favours the arguments of one of the parties even in the face of incon-
trovertible legal evidence to the contrary, or when a certain fact is considered to have been 
proved when it has not even been proved circumstantially.  
When viewed in this light, impartiality becomes a subjective concept, very difficult to pin-
point as it has to do with a certain mental attitude which demonstrates the absence of bias 
towards one of the parties or towards a particular issue. Here, we must make a distinction 
between two words: sympathy and partiality. Sympathy means favouring one person, without 
                                                 
1041 E. Verdera y Tuells, “Algunas consideraciones en torno al arbitraje comercial”, RCEA, vol. X, 1994, pp. 
137-177 (174). 
1042 M. Tupman, “Challenge and Disqualification of Arbitrators in International Commercial Arbitration”, 
Int’l & Comp. L. Q., vol. 38, 1989, pp. 26 et seq. (45) 
1043 D. Bishop and L. Reed, “Practical Guidelines for Interviewing, Selecting and Challenging Party-
Appointed Arbitrators in International Cmmercial Arbitration”, Arb. Int’l, vol. 14, nº 4, 1998, pp. 407-423. 
1045 E.g. the new Article 815 c.p.c. italiano. See C. Consolo, “La ricusazione dell’árbitro”, Riv. arb., vol. VIII, 
1998, pp. 17-31; id., “Imparcialita degli arbitri. Ricusazione”, Riv. arb., vol. XV, 2005, pp. 727-743. 
1046 E. Fazzalari, “Ancora sulla imparcialità dell’árbitro”, Riv. arb., vol. VIII, 1998, pp. 3-4. 
1047 C. Giovannucci Orlandi, “Ethics for International Arbitrators”, University of Missouri-Kansas City L. 
Rev., vol. 67, 1998, pp. 93 et seq. (109). 
1048 In the U.K. courts: Wessanen’s Koninklijke Fabrieken N.V. v. Isaac Modiano, Brother & Sons, Ltd., 2 
Lloyd’s Rep.257 (1960). 
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regard to another; partiality means favouring one person at the expense of another1049. Arbi-
trators do not represent the interests of any of the parties. Impartiality does not mean not be-
ing part of something; it is a certain kind of motivation consistent with the statement or deci-
sion based on the desire to tell the truth, to pass judgement precisely, to rule justly or legally. 
The arbitrator, like the judge, must set aside any subjective considerations, and forget his own 
personality - it is to the emotional sphere what objectivity is to the intellect. Common law 
authors define impartiality as acting without pressure, which means giving a fair ruling on the 
issue. As in the case of judges and magistrates, the impartiality of an arbitrator is something 
that is presumed, and proof of its absence should be based on solid facts and not on mere 
personal appreciations dictated by circumstances1050. With regard to this, certain “social indi-
cators” such as belonging to a certain religion, profession, or political party are not generally 
considered circumstances conducive to partiality, neither is the frequent appearance in scien-
tific circles such as, for example, a teaching or research institute or a periodical.  
The above is particularly relevant in international commercial arbitration due to the fre-
quent coexistence of diverse legal cultures which could lead to misunderstandings, above all 
when people from the common law world and the sphere of written law are present in the 
proceedings. What, for some, may constitute a partial attitude, for others may not1051. 
 
2.2. Independence 
 
18. It has been said, correctly, that independence is not only a virtue but also a con-
dition inherent to the freedom to judge, implying that this freedom is beyond any ideo-
logical, political, or professional consideration1052. The principle of independence in 
commercial arbitration is an objective and material empowering criterion with respect 
to the parties and arbitration as a profession. It implies an objective assessment with 
the purpose of determining whether or not the arbitrator and one of the parties are act-
ing in kinship - whether they have, for example, business or financial relations. The 
aim of said assessment is to verify the appearance of bias, not its actual presence1053. If 
impartiality is a spiritual attitude, independence is an objective situation which is far 
easier to define1054 as it can be appreciated in the existence of links between the arbitra-
tors and the parties or with persons closely linked to the latter or with the conflict, be 
they personal, social, economic, financial relations, or of any other kind1055. In this 
                                                 
1049 D.J. Branson, “American Party-Appointed Arbitrators –Not the Three Monkeys”, University of Dayton 
L. Rev., vol. 30, nº 1, 2004, pp. 1-62 (51). 
1050 ECHR Juin 23, 1981, Le Compte, Van Leuven y De Meyer, ECHR 1981, 2, serie A, nº 43, p. 25, ap. 58.  
1051 L. Salvaneschi, “Sull’imparzialità dell’árbitro”, Riv. dir. proc., vol. 59, pp. 409-434. 
1052 See J.D. Bredin, “Qu’est-ce que l’indépendence du juge?”, Justices, nº 3, javier-juin, 1996, p. 165. 
1053 S. Donahey, “The Independence and Neutrality of Arbitrators”, J. Int’l Arb., vol. 9, 1992, p. 31. 
1054 En el Derecho inglés se insiste en la nota de imparcialidad respecto a la de independencia, e.g. Sections 
24 and 33 English Arbitration Act (1996). 
1055 With respect to the arbitrator's requirement of independence, see the interesting and thought-provoking 
article by M. Henry, Le devoir d’indépendence de l’arbitre, Paris, LGDJ, 2001; see also, N. Alam, “Independ-
ence and Imparciality in International Arbitration . As Assessment”, Trasnational Dispute Management, vol. I, 
nº 2, 2004. http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/samples/freearticles/tv1-2-
article205b.htm#_ftn21; L. Trakman, “The Impartiality.and Independence of Arbitrators Recosidered”, Int’l 
Arb’n L.Rev., vol. 10, nº 4, 2007, pp. 124-134. 
José Carlos Fernández Rozas 
 428 
case, assessment implies not the appearance of bias, but its actual presence, derived 
from the circumstances surrounding the exercise of arbitration in a specific case. There 
are two reasons for guaranteeing the independence of the arbitrator: (1) to ensure the 
transparency required for the parties, which they would not otherwise receive, and (2) 
to ensure the integrity of the proceedings, as the silence of one party on a relevant fact 
known by that party over a short period of time is sanctioned with the loss of the right 
to protest or challenge once said period has expired. 
An analysis of these ties shows whether the arbitrator is, or is not, independent. The 
problem is employing this to show lack of independence, using criteria such a prox-
imity, continuity or of a recent nature which, well understood, should be duly accred-
ited. English jurisprudence considers independence to be “an absence of connection 
with either of the parties in the sense of an absence of any interest in, or of any present 
or prospective business or other connection with, one of the parties, which might lead 
the arbitrator to favour the party concerned'an absence of connection with either of the 
parties in the sense of an absence of any interest in, or of any present or prospective 
business or other connection with, one of the parties, which might lead the arbitrator to 
favour the party concerned”1056. An important case is that of Laker Airways Incorpo-
rated v. FLS Aerospace Ltd and another1057. In this case, an arbitrator practiced from 
the same chambers as the counsel for the appointing party. The court ruled that the test 
for removal of an arbitrator under Section 24 of the Arbitration Act of 1996 was objec-
tive in at least two respects. First, the court had to find that circumstances existed, and 
were not merely believed to exist, although it was possible that a belief could be a cir-
cumstance. Secondly, the circumstances found by the court had to justify doubts as to 
the arbitrator's impartiality. An unjustifiable or, perhaps, an unreasonable doubt was 
not sufficient. 
 
19. It should be clear that the independence of the arbitrator must not only be ap-
plied with regard to the parties, but also to their representatives, to other arbitrators or 
to arbitration as a profession. Jurisprudence views these situations with a degree of 
severity, considering as a lack of independence the fact, for example, that the daughter 
of the arbitrator works as a lawyer in the office responsible for proposing said arbitra-
tor, and the arbitrator in question fails to disclose this circumstance1058. 
It seems that the number of times an arbitrator has been put forward as arbitrator or 
president of the arbitral tribunal by the arbitration centre are inversely proportional to 
the presumption of independence. The presumption of independence disappears when 
the same legal firm persistently uses a particular “independent arbitrator”, as these are 
grounds for suspecting a tendency to favour their own interests. Thus, it is advisable 
that the arbitrator, if he is proposed by one of the parties, should mention in his state-
                                                 
1056 England’s Court of Appeal, AT&T Corp v Saudi Cable Co [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 625. See Ph. Sar-
railhé, “L’impartialité et l’indépendance de l’arbitre devant les juges anglais”, Rev. arb., 2001, pp. 211-227. 
1057 (England and Wales) High Court (Queen’s Bench Division, Commercial Court), Rix J., 20th April 1999 
[2000] 1WLR 113; 1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 45. 
1058 CA Paris, December 18, 2008 (SARL Avelines Conseils): “En l’espèce, force est de constater qu’il n’a 
pas été satisfait à cette obligation d’information, la société A. ayant été laissée dans l’ignorance du lien profes-
sionnel étroit existant entre la fille de l’un des arbitres et le conseil [de l’autre partie, qui l’avait choisi]”. 
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ment of independence the number of times he has been proposed by the lawyers of the 
party proposing his appointment. Viewing the sphere of arbitral independence in this 
light, there is no doubt that a different situation can exist with regard to lawyers from 
large firms acting as arbitrators, as these are more liable to have conflicts of interests. 
For this reason there is a certain tendency for jurists specialising in arbitration to leave 
law firms and establish themselves in private practice under the rather pompous title of 
“independent arbitrators” (equivalent to the term “brave soldier”), as if they were the 
only ones meeting such requirements1059.  
 
 
3. Party appointed arbitrators 
 
20. The so called party-appointed arbitrator comes principally from international 
arbitration, although it is now also applied in domestic arbitration. Based on the same, 
the parties are enabled to unilaterally designate one of the arbitrators in a multi-
member tribunal. The existence of this kind of arbitrator has benefitted from the con-
tractual concept of arbitration prevalent in certain systems, where the intervention of 
these third parties is used to supplement the interpretation of an act or contract more 
than to resolve a conflict in normal courts.   
Following the Ury / Galeries Lafayette case1060, French jurisprudence has flatly re-
fused to accept that the mission of the arbitrator derives from a management contract 
that ties him to the proposing party, and therefore rejects the very concept of the arbi-
tre–partie. This has had important repercussions with regard to the responsibility in-
herent in the exercise of his duty and in relation to perceiving his fees1061. For this rea-
son, the presence of party-appointed arbitrators is for them a moral and psychological 
guarantee that their point of view will be understood, even if it is not the one which 
prevails in the end1062.  
In Hitachi counsel to a party regularly recommended a particular arbitrator, also a 
practicing attorney, to clients for appellate cases and vice-versa. The Swiss Federal 
Tribunal emphasized that a party-appointed arbitrator should leave clearly defined his 
professional relationship and his duty of neutrality. A higher degree of independence is 
required for the presiding arbitrator than for a party-appointed arbitrator. An arbitrator 
would lose independence if a party is in a position to influence his judgment. But a 
practicing attorney acting as arbitrator can be expected to discriminate between judicial 
independence and friendly professional relations1063. In the I.S.A. v. V case, the party-
appointed arbitrator had a law partner who represented a third party acting against an 
affiliate of a party in the arbitration. The aforementioned court confirmed that a party-
                                                 
1059 See P.F. Schlosser, “L’impartialité et l’indépendence de l’arbitre en droit allemand”, Riv. arb., vol. XV, 
2005, pp. 1-15. 
1060 Cass. civ. 2ème, April 13, 1972, Rev. arb., 1975, pp. 235 et seq. note E. Loquin. 
1061 Cass. civ. 2ème, July 3, 1996 (Société méridionale d’equipements sanitaires et sociaux (Somes) / de Saint-
Rapt et autres), Rev. arb., 1996, pp. 405 et seq.; see Ph. Fouchard, “Le statut de l’arbitre...”, loc. cit., p. 330. 
1062 CA Paris, January 16, 2003 (Société des télécommunications internationales du Cameroun (Intelcam) / 
SA France Télécom), Rev. arb., 2004, pp. 369 et seq. note L. Jaeger. 
1063 ATF, June 30, 1994, Hitachi Ltd SMS Schloemann, Bull. ASA, vol. 15, 1997, pp. 99-107. 
José Carlos Fernández Rozas 
 430 
appointed arbitrator does not lose his independence just because one of his partners is 
acting against an affiliate of one of the parties1064. 
 
21. In the U.S., party-appointed arbitrators have spawned copious amounts of legal 
literature and received great attention from the courts1065. Party-appointed arbitrators 
are traditionally not obliged to meet the same levels of independence and impartiality 
imposed on other arbitrators. In its original version, Canon VII of the AAA–ABA 
Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes allows these arbitrators to be 
“predisposed” in favour of the party appointing them, and to communicate with said 
party, being only subject to a general requirement of integrity and good faith. The same 
position is taken by a jurisprudential trend illustrated by the decision of the Court of 
Appeals of New York, March 28, 1962, which expressly stated that this kind of arbitra-
tor may be “partisan . . . but not dishonest” 1066, accepting the appointment of an arbi-
trator who was also a member of the board of directors of one of the parties. 
Nevertheless, in 2004 the ABA and the AAA revised their Code in order to bring it 
into line with international tradition and practice, establishing from that moment the 
presumption of neutrality for all arbitrators, including party appointed arbitrators, and 
demanding of them all, in the same measure, absolute independence and impartial-
ity1067. The Code requires all party-appointed arbitrators, whether neutral or not, to 
make pre-appointment disclosures of any facts which might affect their neutrality, in-
dependence, or impartiality. This Code also requires all party-appointed arbitrators to 
ascertain and disclose as soon as practicable whether the parties intended for them to 
serve neutrally or not. 
It should be noted that the revised Code subjects the principle of neutrality to the 
parties, the law or regulations applicable to the arbitration in question establishing the 
contrary. In short, the principle of neutrality is negotiable The ethical obligation estab-
lished in the 2004 Code distinguishes between those applicable to arbitrators in general 
and those prescribed for party-appointed arbitrators. In this respect, this kind of arbitra-
tor is allowed to be predisposed towards the parties appointing him, and even to main-
tain conversations with them outside the court of arbitration. The principle of neutrality 
applied to party-appointed arbitrators has prevailed in arbitration doctrine and practice, 
but ethical problems are constantly arising and are no less threatening to the impartial-
ity and independence of arbitrators. Perhaps because of this, the Code at the same time 
emphasizes that arbitrators must act in good faith, with integrity and fairness. Said 
                                                 
1064 ATF, February 9, 1998, I S.A. v V, Bull. ASA, vol. 16, 1999, pp. 634 et seq. 
1065 M. Hunter and J. Paulsson, “A Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in International Commercial Arbitration”, 
Arbitration, vol. 13, 1985, pp. 153 et seq; P. Bellet, “Des arbitres neutres et non neutres”, Études de droit inter-
national en l’honneur del Pierre Lalive, Bâle/Frankfurt Main, Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1993, pp. 399-409; L.S. 
Murray, “Impartiality of the Party – Appointed Arbitrator”, Arb. Int’l, vol. 6, 1990, pp. 320-322; D.A. Kennedy, 
“Predisposed With Integrity: The Elusive Quest for Justice in Tripartite Arbitrations, Georgetown. J. Legal 
Ethics, vol. 8, 1995, pp. 749 et seq; J.H. Carter, “Living with the Party-Appointed Arbitrator: Judicial Confusion, 
Ethical Codes and Practical Advice”, Am. Rev. Intl. Arb., vol. 3, 1992, pp. 153 et seq; id., “Improving Life with 
the Party-Appointed Arbitrator: Clearer Conduct Guidelines for ‘Non Neutrals’”, Am. Rev. Intl. Arb., vol. 11, 
2000, pp. 295 et seq. 
1066 Matter of Astoria Medical Group (Health Ins. Plan), 11 NY 2nd; 182 N.E. 2d 85(1962). 
1067 D.J. Branson, “American Party-Appointed Arbitrators...”, loc. cit., pp. 1-62. 
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dependence does not exonerate them, however, from being subject to ethical standards 
which promote the integrity and fairness of the arbitration process, including, though 
not limited to not engaging in delaying tactics; and not making statements to the other 
arbitrators knowing them to be false or misleading.  
 
22. From a theoretical point of view, it is understood that an arbitrator’s appointment 
should not undermine his freedom, although in practice the method of appointment can 
distort the exercise of arbitration because of all the factors involved in the loss of inde-
pendence and impartiality and the risk that the third party called in to resolve the dis-
pute becomes an agent of the party, thus detracting from his original mission1068. The 
practice, in fact, gradually tended toward appointing persons who felt close to the par-
ties as co-arbitrators, acting practically as representatives of the latter, and considering 
the impartiality of the third arbitrator, acting as president of the arbitral tribunal1069, to 
be sufficient, to the extent that it has been said that the presence of party-appointed 
arbitrators are a moral or psychological guarantee to the parties that their point of view 
will be heard, although it might not prevail in the end1070. Nevertheless, a certain sector 
of arbitration professionals wonders why an arbitrator should be used to defend the 
party when they have lawyers to supply this need. The problem is aggravated by the 
fact that in certain arbitrations there are not many arbitrators to choose from and the 
parties tend to appoint an arbitrator in order to further their claim1071.  
 
23. As a direct result of Article 12(2) of the LMU most legislation includes the re-
quirement that “all” arbitrators should remain independent and impartial1072. Spanish 
legislation from 2003 imposes this requirement on arbitrators “irrespective of who 
appointed them” (Statement of Purposes). 
Selecting an arbitrator is perhaps one of the most delicate aspects of arbitration1073. 
Evidently, when choosing an arbitrator, the parties seek, among other factors1074, 
maximum predisposition in their favour and the least hostility, e.g., a combination of 
                                                 
1068 L. Laudisa, “Árbitro nominato dalla parte o árbitro di parte?”, Riv. arb., vol. IX, 1999, pp. 363-374; J. 
Dolinger, “O Árbitro da Parte – Considerações Éticas e Práticas”, Revista Brasileira de Arbitragem, nº 6, 2005, 
pp. 29-44. 
1069 C. Consolo, “Arbitri di parte ‘non neutrale’”, Riv. arb., vol. XI, 2001, pp. 9-17. 
1070 D. Hascher, “Principes et pratiques de procedure dans l’arbitrage commercial international”, R. des C., t. 
279, 1999, pp. 51-193 (141). 
1071 R.D. Taichert, “Why not Provide for Neutral Party-Appointed Arbitrators? “, Disp. Res. J., vol. 57, nº 4, 
2002-2003. 
1072 E. Fazzalari, “L’etica dell’arbitrato”, Riv. arb., vol. II, 1992, pp. 1-6 (3-4). 
1073 T.E. Carbonneau, “The Exercice of Contract Freedom in the Making of Arbitration Agreement”, Van-
derbilt J. Trans’l L., vol. 36, 2003, pp. 1189 et seq. (1209). 
1074 L. Kopelmanas, “La rédaction des clauses d’arbitrage et le choix des arbitres”, Hommage à Frédéric Ei-
semann, Paris, ICC Services Sarl, 1978, pp. 23-30; E. Robine, “Le choix del arbitres”, Rev. arb., 1990, pp. 315-
336; .J.H. Carter, “The Selection of Arbitrators”, Am. Rev. Int’l Arb., vol. 5, 1994, pp. 84-96; D. Bishop and L. 
Reed, “Practical Guidelines for Interviewing, Selecting and Challenging Party-Appointed Arbitrators in Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration”, Arb. Int’l, vol. 14, 1998, pp. 395 et seq.; P. Lalive, “Le choix de l’arbitre”, 
Mélanges Jacques Robert, “Libertés”, Paris, Montchrestien, 1998, pp. 353-363; C.T. Salomon, “Selecting in 
International Arbitrator: Five Factor To Considerer”, Mealey’s International Arbitration Report, vol. 17, nº 10, 
2002, pp. 25-28. http://www.arbitralwomen.org/files/publication/ 0405202743129.pdf. 
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judge and lawyer acting for the party appointing him, which can be summed up in the 
phrase “my arbitrator” 1075. To achieve this, the party needs copious information about 
the candidate, sometimes even resorting to the incorrect practice of subjecting him to 
an interview to interrogate him about his attitude to the case. Despite these disreputable 
practices to which candidate should not lend themselves, there is nothing irregular in 
proposing a candidate as a party-appointed arbitrator1076, although the arbitrator thus 
appointed usually undertakes to ensure that the case presented by the party appointing 
him will be correctly heard and understood by all members of the arbitral tribunal. 
Independence does not imply indifference, and even the hostility, on the part of the 
appointed arbitrator1077. 
The arbitrator has no duty to the party appointing him, and in no way are they his 
clients. He should always act impartially and independently with respect to all parties 
to the arbitration, ensuring that all issues raised are resolved and that the arguments and 
evidence put forward by all parties are considered. Said duties prevent this kind of 
arbitrator from communicating with the party appointing him on issues relevant to the 
case as this would violate the right of all parties to equal treatment and also prevent the 
arbitrator from feeling compelled to disclose how he voted if the award is not favour-
able to the party appointing him.  
It is a serious error to consider that the arbitrator should protect the interests of the 
party appointing him, and this takes us back to the subject of “truncated arbitration 
proceedings”: a situation could occur in which the arbitrator appointed by one of the 
parties damaged by this value judgement, forgetting the neutrality which should dictate 
his actions at all times, leaves the court in order to hinder or delay the foreseeable re-
sults of the process. 
 
 
4. Disqualification of arbitrators due to breach of the requirement of transparency 
 
4.1. Different cases 
 
24. There is no single model for obtaining disqualifying arbitrators and, in spite of 
conventional wisdom, the continental tradition is only seemingly more restrictive than 
that of common law countries1078. In comparative law there are two technical options 
which range from applying to arbitrators the same grounds provided for ordinary 
judges, or to establishing a more flexible system with generic grounds; this has been 
                                                 
1075 Ph. Grandjean, Rev. arb., 2000, p. 310. 
1076 See la práctica en U.S.A. en A. Lowenfeld, “The Party-Appointted Arbitrator in International controver-
sias: Some Reflections”, Tex. Int’l L. J., vol. 30, 1995, pp. 59-69. 
1077 Se apunta en tal sentido a que no resulta aceptable que el árbitro mantenga una actitud de desconocimien-
to absoluto hacia la parte que lo ha seleccionado: A. Beyly, “The Manager and Arbitration”, J. Int’l Arb’n, vol. 3, 
nº 7, 1986, pp. 7 et seq. 
1078 L. Dittrich, “L’imparzialità dell’árbitro nell’arbitrato interno ed internazionale”, Riv. dir. proc., vol. L, 
1995, p. 160. 
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gaining ground in different national systems due to the influence of the Uncitral Model 
Law1079. 
An arbitrator can be challenged when it is reasonable to assume a lack of impartial-
ity, the existence of partiality or some degree of interest on the part of the arbitrator in 
the arbitration award. This interest or partiality can be direct, true and reasonably veri-
fied instead of being something distant or speculative. There are many circumstances 
which can lead to an arbitrator being challenged on grounds of partiality, although it is 
customary to accredit that the arbitrator maintains an attitude of “personal partiality” 
with respect to one of the parties1080. Without going into a detailed analysis, lack of 
transparency can derive from: 
 
i) Personal relationships, e.g. maintaining, or having maintained, family ties through 
blood or marriage with one of the parties, their lawyers or witnesses1081, or being a 
member of the family, commercial company or the guarantor or insurer of the deben-
tures of one of the parties, or holding bonds or shares in a party who is a company.  
 
ii) A hostile attitude towards one of the parties, their lawyers or witnesses, such as having 
brought proceedings against one of the parties or having been accused by one of them in 
another case, started or settled, in recent years. In Canadian jurisprudence, the grounds for 
challenging one of the arbitrators, established in the Société de transport de la Rive-Sud de 
Montréal c. Syndicat canadien de la fonction publique, S.L., is based on manifest hatred bet-
ween the arbitrator and one of the parties: “La récusation peut aussi être accordée s’il y a 
inimitié capitale entre les arbitres et une partie. L’inimitié est plus forte que la partialité” 1082. 
 
iii) Prior knowledge on the part of the arbitrator of certain facts related to the dispute 
which could condition his future ruling. This can lead to vacating the award, or to partial 
vacation on the grounds of lack of independence1083. 
 
iv) The arbitrator being a member of the board of the arbitration service provider 
charged with appointing the arbitrators; or being a member of an arbitration association to 
which other actors in the arbitration process also belong. Nevertheless, in Red Eléctrica de 
España, S.A. / Iberdrola Distribución Eléctrica, S.A. the Provincial Court of Madrid con-
sidered that the fact that the president of the arbitral tribunal and one of the appointed arbi-
trators were both vice-chairmen of an arbitration association of which the lawyer of one of 
the parties was secretary was not a violation of the principles of independence and imparti-
ality established in Article 17(1) of the Spanish Arbitration Act (2003)1084. 
                                                 
1079 C. Consolo, “La ricusazione dell’árbitro”, Riv. arb., vol. 8, 1998, pp. 17-32. 
1080 H. Van Houtte, “Les critères de récusation de l’arbitre”, Les arbitres internationaux: Colloque du 4 
février 2005, París, Centre Français de Droit Comparé, 8, 2005, pp. 95-100. 
1081 ATF, September 16, 1988, Société Ligier et Société Diffusia / Société Alfa Lancia Industriale, Rev. arb., 
1989, pp. 505 ss. 
1082 [2001] 3333, IIJCan 11369 (QC A.G.). 
1083 P. Lalive, J.-F. Poudret and C. Raymond, Le droit de l’arbitrage interne et international en Suisse, Lau-
sanne, Payot, 1989, p. 440; C.A. Paris, December 4, 1979, Cornú / Comptoir commercial André & Cie, Rev. 
arb., 1981, p. 146 note J. Rubellin-Devichi. 
1084 AP Madrid, February 15, 2008, Arbitraje, vol. II, nº 1, 2009, pp. 269 et seq. note S. Álvarez González. 
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v) The existence of an academic relationship or membership of a particular state admin-
istrative body. This circumstance is not usually accepted. An interesting example is the 
judgement of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of Costa Rica on 3 May, 
2002 (Scott Paper Company, S.A. / Dario Express R. Castro e hijos, S.A.), in relation to a 
group of lecturers from the Escuela Libre de Derecho, which states that “the fact that two 
lawyers are lecturers at the same teaching institute does not necessarily raise doubts about 
the impartiality of the arbitrators appointed to settle the dispute. Because of the special 
features of this particular type of subordinate relationship, by virtue of the principles of 
academic freedom . . . we consider that this situation is far removed from ordinary friend-
ship or loyalty among colleagues”1085. An example of the second case is the Minas de Al-
madén y Arrayanes, S.A. / Normaluminium, S.A. case, where the Provincial Court of Ma-
drid found it absolutely absurd to consider that membership of the corps of national legal 
advisors of Spain could give rise to such strong ties with government institutions and bod-
ies “that its members, even when they are in a situation of voluntary leave of absence from 
their post or have lost their membership through resignation of for other causes, continue to 
be surrounded by an aura of bias which prevents them from acting as arbitrators in disputes 
in which public entities or companies are involved”1086. 
 
25. An arbitrator’s religion, ethnic or national origin, gender, age, class, means or sexual 
orientations cannot ordinarily form a sound basis as an objection. However, there have 
been cases surrounded by a certain aura of “conflict of civilizations”. In Westland Helicop-
ters the defendant, an Egyptian company, called into question the legality of the composi-
tion of the arbitral tribunal, consisting of a Swedish, French and Swiss nationals, on the 
grounds that it did not include any national from a developing country. This issue cannot be 
ignored, above all, when dealing with arbitrations with Arab countries with regard to the 
religious persuasion of the arbitrator.  In this case, the grounds for challenging the arbitra-
tors were based on strange reasons of locality, their nationality being linked to that of the 
arbitration court; as was the case of an ICC arbitration where Geneva was chosen as the site 
of the arbitration court and an arbitrator from the city was appointed, a circumstance which 
was challenged on the grounds that it was an EU member state (sic), and upon being ap-
prised of the error, refused to back down on the grounds that the city of Geneva is too close 
to, and thus purportedly under the influence of France1087.  
A different question is that of determining the possibility of being appointed arbitra-
tor in two different disputes (heard before different institutions) by the same party. The 
first consideration is that the confidence which one party has in a particular profes-
sional does not constitute impartiality, but rather a belief in the good judgement of the 
arbitrator.  In the U.S., the AAA examines this circumstance in its table of ethics for 
international arbitrators. An arbitrator's past or current participation in a connected 
                                                 
1085 http://200.91.68.20/scij/busqueda/jurisprudencia/jur_repartidor.asp?param1=XYZ&param2=1&nV 
alor1=1&nValor2=196342&strTipM=T&lResultado=9&strLib=LIB. 
1086 AP Madrid, September 15, 2008, http://audiencias.vlex.es/vid/51238484. 
1087 P. Lalive, “Sur des dimensions culturelles de l’arbitrage international”, Theory of International Law at 
the thershold of the 21 st. Century. Essays in honor of Krzysztof Skubiszewski, La Haya, Kluwer Law Interna-
tional, La Haya, 1996, p. 771; id., “Dérives arbitrales (II)”, Bull. ASA, vol. 24, nº 1, 2006, p. 4.  
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dispute has led to a certain degree of controversy in French doctrine, which has come 
down in favour of the inexistence of lack of independence or of impartiality. In Ben 
Nasser et autre / BNP et Crédit Lyonnais the Cour de appel stated that if the arbitrator 
has acted in parallel disputes, he could be influenced when the time comes to deliver 
his verdict on the second case. However, there is “ni prévention ni préjugé lorsque 
l’arbitre est appelé à se prononcer sur une situation de fait proche de celle examinée 
antérieurement, mais entre parties différentes”1088. 
Within the circumstances discussed above, recent practice emphasises two situations 
in which the impartiality of the arbitrator can be seen to be compromised: (1) his links 
with the parties or with the laws firms to which their lawyers belong, and (2) his mem-
bership of a particular arbitration organization to which said lawyers and/or other arbi-
trators also belong. 
 
4.2. Relations between arbitrators and the parties and/or their representatives 
 
26. The existence of a relationship between the arbitrators and the parties and/or 
their representatives does not always lead to a situation of partiality, providing grounds 
for challenging the arbitrator1089. Arbitration circles are small enough to accept the 
possibility that arbitrators have, or could have had, some professional contact with the 
parties. On the other hand, some disputes require such a depth of specialization and 
knowledge of the disputed issue that the circle of professionals is further reduced or 
leads to a small number of jurists constantly appearing in different roles (arbitrators, 
legal representatives, corporate representatives, experts, etc.). This situation, and the 
frequent interaction of arbitration positions held by the same person, frequently chal-
lenges the principle of neutrality1090. Bearing these observations in mind, arbitration 
has gone through many changes. 
French jurisprudence showed signs of great flexibility in the Philipp Brothers case, 
rejecting the possibility that one professional could challenge en masse all the other 
professionals around him1091, insisting that membership of a large legal firm with divi-
sions and multiple specializations does not necessarily involve an “association of inter-
ests” which justifies such a challenge1092. Having established this point, practice 
increasingly shows greater individualization of circumstances in which a challenge 
brought against an arbitrator on the grounds of lack of independence is accepted.  
                                                 
1088 CA Paris, October 14, 1993, Rev. arb., 1994, pp. 380 et seq. note P. Bellet; C. Raymond, “ Des connais-
sances personnelles de l’arbitre à son information privilégiée”, Rev. arb., 1991, pp. 3-18. 
1089 J. Robert, “Influence sur la validité de l’arbitrage des rapports antérieurs des arbitres avec les parties”, 
Rev. arb., 1969, pp. 43-55; Ph. Fouchard, E. Gaillard and B. Goldman, Traité d’arbitrage commercial interna-
tional, Paris, Litec, 1999, pp. 584; J.L. Delvolvé, J. Roche and G.H. Pointon, French Arbitration. Law and 
Practice, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2003, pp. 97 et seq. 
1090 For a comprehensive review of the position, see P. Lalive, “Sur l’irresponsabilité arbitrale”, Etudes de 
Procédure et d’arbitrage en l’honneu de J.-F. Poudret, Faculté de Droit de l’Université de Lausanne, 1999, pp. 
419-435. 
1091 TGI Paris, October 28, 1988 and 29 Juin 29, 1989, Rev. arb., 1990, p. 497. 
1092 CA, Paris Juin 28, 1992 (KFTCIC / Icori Estero), Rev. arb., 1992, pp. 568 et seq. note P. Bellet. 
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The English courts sustain that the mere appearance of partiality is sufficient to dis-
qualify an arbitrator1093. An interesting precedent is Veritas Shipping Corp. v. Anglo–
Canadian Cement, Ltd., in which a London court removed the arbitrator appointed by 
one of the parties in a dispute because he referred to himself as the arbitrator of the 
defendant. In another case, the arbitrator was disqualified because of the fact that there 
was a close connection between him and one of the parties as he was a present or past 
managing director of that party. The grounds given by the London court was that arbi-
trators should not only act fairly and impartially, but should also be seen to do so1094.  
 
27. Several decisions arising in the context of ICSID arbitration have been given on this is-
sue, although not enough to extract a consolidated doctrine, as presumed conflicts of interests 
have led to different decisions regarding the eligibility of the arbitrator. In Holiday Inns v. 
Morocco, the applicant's arbitrator had to abandon the dispute when he revealed that four 
years previously he had been the director of one of the applicants1095. Likewise, in Amco v. 
Indonesia, the defendant challenged the arbitrator appointed by the applicant because before 
his appointment he had personally given tax advice to the main shareholder of the applicant 
company, and his firm of lawyers had also had, before the start of the arbitration, a utility 
distribution arrangement with the applicants' lawyers, even though at the time of said ar-
rangement neither the shareholder nor the applicant had been clients of either of the law 
firms. Although the concern of the challenging party was reasonable, the proposal to disqual-
ify was rejected on the grounds that it was insufficiently important in the circumstances of the 
case1096. 
In the Zhinvali case, the challenge was based on the existence of occasional, purely social, 
contacts between the arbitrator in question and an executive playing a key part in the invest-
ment made by the applicant. The other two arbitrators remarked on the absence of any pro-
fessional or business relationship between the arbitrator and the person involved, and rejected 
the challenge, concluding that suggesting that occasional personal contact could significantly 
affect an arbitrator's judgement, in the absence of additional facts, was pure speculation1097. 
Finally, in the Vivendi case, the challenged arbitrator had disclosed that one of his law 
partners had been engaged as a tax advisor by the investment company's predecessor, and 
that he had not taken part in said activity. In this case, the arbitrators ruling on the challenge 
                                                 
1093 Metropolitan Properties Co. Ltd. v. Lannon [1969] QB 577 (599) (per Lord Denning). M. Tupman, 
“Challenge and Disqualification of Arbitrators...”, loc. cit., p. 50. 
1094 [1966] 1 Lloyd´s L. Rep. 76 (Q.B. 1965).  
1095 In a case dealing with the consequences of the attempted resignation of an arbitrator who sought to condi-
tion his resignation to the fact that the Claimant, who appointed him in the first place, be allowed to appoint his 
successor, in what came to be known as “The Incident of Sir John Foster, 19” the two other members of the 
Arbitral Tribunal decided to disregard the condition attached to the resignation, the vacancy having been filled 
pursuant to Article 56(3) of the ICSID Convention by the Administrative Council of the ICSID”, Holiday Inns 
S.A. and others v. Morocco (Case No. ARB/72/1), ICSID Ann.Rep., 1977, pp. 32 et seq.). 
1096 ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Amco Asia Corporation and others v. Republic of Indonesia, Decision on the 
Proposal to Disqualify an Arbitrator (June 24, 1982), unpublished. 
1097 ICSID Case No. ARB/00/1, Zhinvali Development Ltd. c. Republica de Georgia, Decision on the 
Proposal to Disqualify an Arbitrator, January 19, 2001, unpublished). 
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considered that the continuing relationship between the partner and the company was not 
sufficiently significant for these effects, and rejected the challenge1098. 
 
28. Fatal employer–employee relationships sometimes arise when arbitrators have previ-
ously worked for governments and international organizations that are parties to an arbitra-
tion. The results are not always easy to predict, although one is comforted by the fact that no 
two arbitrations are alike. For example, the arbitration did not proceed in the Buraimi Oasis 
Arbitration (1955) between Great Britain and Saudi Arabia when it was established that one 
arbitrator had previously served as a Saudi Arabian government official and was in charge of 
arbitration there1099. In contrast, an arbitrator who had previously advised the US government 
on issues related to the arbitration in question was unsuccessfully challenged1100. 
 
29. Following Promotora Industrial Balear, S:A. / Alba Balear Motor, S.A., where the ar-
bitral award was vacated because it was proven that the arbitrator had professional ties with 
the majority shareholder of one of the companies involved in the dispute1101, Spanish juris-
prudence has been prone to flexible interpretations when ascertaining the relationship be-
tween the arbitrator and the party proposing him. To this end it rejects the interpretation that 
the same grounds for removing and challenging judges can be applied to arbitrators. This was 
illustrated in Rostock Poyectos, S.L. / Técnicas Reunidas, S.A., in which the Provincial Court 
of Madrid held that the link between the arbitrator and an important law firm representing 
one of the parties had not been proven1102. Later, in Skoda Power, S.A. / Abener Energia–El 
Sauz, S.A. de C.V., the same Provincial Court stated that the fact that at the time of delivering 
his award the president of the arbitral tribunal was a member of a firm of lawyers negotiating 
a merger (which was successful) with the law firm representing one of the parties was not 
detrimental to the principle of equality and independence1103. In such cases, Spanish courts 
have had to take sides in a “battle of evidence” potentially compromising the impartiality of 
the arbitrator, opposed by other, contrary, evidence which for the time being has prevailed. 
 
4.3. Membership of the arbitrator or the secretary of the arbitral tribunal of the com-
mittee of an arbitration institution 
 
30. The complex nature of the duties of an arbitration institution calls for serious 
questions to be raised about what should be done when a member of an arbitration 
institution is a party to the arbitration it administers against another party who has no 
relationship with the institution. In this case there is clearly a position of privilege with 
                                                 
1098 ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universal c. República 
Argentina, Decision on the challenge to the President of the Committee, ICSID Review—Foreign Investment 
Law Journal, pp. 182-196. 
10991955 U.N.Y.B. 339-340; (1953) I.L.C.Y.B. 51.52. 
1100 A.J. van den Berg, “Justifiable Doubts as to the Arbitrator’s Impartiality or Independence”, Leiden J. Int’l 
L., vol. 10, 1997, pp. 509-519; P. Lalive, “Cultural Differences and International Arbitration”, Euromoney, vol. 
9, 1995, pp. 13-15. 
1101 AP Baleares, February 4, 1997, AC\1977\318. 
1102 See supra, note 6. 
1103 See supra note 45. 
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respect to the appointment of the arbitrators, raising doubts on the impartiality needed 
in any arbitration1104. Because of this, more firmly consolidated arbitration institutions 
take firm action on these issues by preventing their arbitrators from acting as arbitra-
tors in disputes administered by the institution in question. In this respect, Article 2 of 
Appendix II of the ICC Rules (“Internal Rules”) assumes complete incompatibility, 
albeit accepting certain changes, showing a degree of corporate protection. This article 
provides that: 
 
1. The Chairman and the members of the Secretariat of the Court may not act as arbitrators or as counsel 
in cases submitted to ICC arbitration. 
2. The Court shall not appoint Vice–Chairmen or members of the Court as arbitrators. They may, how-
ever, be proposed for such duties by one or more of the parties, or pursuant to any other procedure agreed 
upon by the parties, subject to confirmation. 
3. When the Chairman, a Vice–Chairman or a member of the Court or of the Secretariat is involved in any 
capacity whatsoever in proceedings pending before the Court, such person must inform the Secretary General 
of the Court upon becoming aware of such involvement. 
4. Such person must refrain from participating in the discussions or in the decisions of the Court concern-
ing the proceedings and must be absent from the courtroom whenever the matter is considered. 
5. Such person will not receive any material documentation or information pertaining to such proceedings. 
 
This incompatibility is frequently found in the rules of arbitration applied in leading 
institutions1105. It can also be found in some national systems, as is the case of Italy, in 
Article 932 c.p.c. when regulating arbitration administered in compliance with pre-
established rules, and which could affect international arbitration proceedings choosing 
Italy as their venue1106. From an ethical standpoint, a situation of obvious incompatibil-
ity would also arise if a member of an arbitration institution should advise on the 
drafting of a document which includes the arbitration agreement, as he could have an 
interest in the validity of said agreement, or even, indirectly, in favouring the interests 
that, at that time, he defended on behalf of the party for whom he acted as adviser. The 
same situation would arise if a member of the arbitration institution should, during the 
arbitration, act as consultant to one of the parties to the dispute, as there is a chance of 
him participating either in the pre-arbitration decisions which condition the interven-
tion of the arbitrator, or in the control of the arbitrators, a function inherent to the ad-
ministration of arbitration.  
Some ethical codes are not usually very strict in this sense, and simply warn arbitration 
institutions to refrain from appointing as arbitrators any person holding an administrative or 
management post, who is a member of their governing body, or who is on their staff, 
unless the parties jointly agree to appoint such a person, or the rules allow this kind of ap-
                                                 
1104 See J.C. Fernández Rozas, “Luces y sombras del arbitraje internacional en los litigios internacionales”, 
RCEA, vol. XXIII, 2008, pp. 71-104 (85-86). 
1105 Article 2(2) Arbitration Rules of the Chamber of Commerce of Geneva that provides that members of 
Committee cannot be arbitrators of counsel in the arbitrations of the Chamber.  
1106 Article 832.3º: “Le istituzioni di carattere asociativo e quelle costituite per la rappresentanza degli 
interesi di categorie professionale non possono nominare arbitri nelle controversia che contrappongono i propri 
assciati o appartenenti alla categoría profesionale a terzi”. See A. Briguglio, “La dimensione transnazionale 
dell’arbitrato”, Riv. arb., vol. 15, 2005, pp. 679-709 (699). 
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pointment, and provide that in such circumstances appointment should be limited to the 
post of single arbitrator or president of the arbitration panel. 
The trend towards this practice is even more flexible in Spain, as can be seen in Comsa, 
S.A. y Emte, S.A. Ingenieria y Promociones Eolicas, S.L. e Índalo Eólica, S.L., where the 
Provincial Court of Madrid rejected a challenge on the grounds of lack of independence 
and impartiality in spite of the fact that the arbitrators were, respectively, chairman and 
vice-chairman of the Court of Arbitration appointing them1107. 
 
31. Provided the secretary of the arbitral tribunal performs merely organisational duties, 
his presence in the proceedings should not give rise to any problems. The limit is reached, 
however, if the secretary encroaches on tasks which only concern the arbitrators and their 
duties - incidentally, these may never extend to decision-making duties. Discrepancies 
arise, however, when they take on legal tasks which go beyond simply assisting the panel, 
or which have a certain relationship of dependency with the arbitral institution provider1108. 
In the first case, the task of contributing doctrinal or case-law documents and drawing up 
summaries of the same, preparing certain draft resolutions related to the proceedings, writ-
ing factual summaries of the arbitration award, is perfectly permissible. In the second case, 
although some arbitration rules confirm that the secretary of the arbitral tribunal should be 
a member of staff of the arbitration institution and accept and even encourage the presence 
of a secretary who is a staff member, the answer should be otherwise, as this constitutes a 
breach of the required independence which should be maintained by the arbitral tribunal 
with respect to the arbitration service provider. 
 
 
III. ETHICAL ELEMENTS OF THE ARBITRAL SERVICE 
 
1. Availability 
 
32. Professionals charged with serving as arbitrators take on an extremely complex and 
delicate task, as they are called to settle a dispute setting the parties against each other, and 
because of this, the discharge of their duties must comply with certain principles and stan-
dards which guarantee the suitability of the decision they reach, e.g., strictly adhering to a 
number of ethical aspects related to arbitration. Based on these, there is a combination of 
specialities, from university lecturers to trial lawyers, usually with a practical training in 
common law.  
Notwithstanding the greater or lesser advantages of this latter choice, a basic characteris-
tic of arbitration is availability, which should be strictly ascertained by the arbitration ser-
vice provider if opting for institutional arbitration. The institution should, indeed, guarantee 
that the arbitrators will have enough time to analyze and evaluate to a reasonable extent all 
the allegations of the parties and avoid appointing arbitrators with excessive work loads. 
Indeed, one of the arguments put forward against the practice followed in certain arbitra-
                                                 
1107 AP Madrid, November 25, 2008, JUR 2009\182094. 
1108 J.C. Fernández Rozas, Tratado de arbitraje comercial internacional en América Latina, Madrid, Iustel, 
2008, pp. 571-573. 
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tion circles is that arbitrators devote little time to the case brought before them due to 
overwork1109. An arbitrator may be an excellent professional, but he must have time to 
devote to the dispute with which he is entrusted, and at times may not be the right profes-
sional to settle a particular case in a reasonable time. Practice has shown that arbitrators 
much sought after for their quality excessively prolong settlement of the dispute to the 
detriment of the proposing parties1110. For example, Section 33(1) (b) English Arbitration 
Act (1996) provides that an arbitrator who fails to proceed with reasonable speed in con-
ducting an arbitration and making his award, may be removed by a competent court. 
Availability is discussed in the rules of arbitration, and accompanies the statement of inde-
pendence. We need go no further than Article 20(1) of the ICC Rule, with provides that 
“[w]hen a hearing is to be held, the Arbitral Tribunal, giving reasonable notice, shall sum-
mon the parties to appear before it on the day and at the place fixed by it”. The same is 
established in Canon IV of the AAA–ABA Code of Ethics, which provides that an arbitra-
tor must discharge his duties with diligence and settle the dispute in the shortest possible 
time permitted by the circumstances of the case. 
Likewise, arbitrators must be willing to tackle the legal difficulties arising in the dis-
charge of their service, and if they are part of an arbitral tribunal they must be on a par with 
the other arbitrators in order to take part in their discussions on an equal footing. In this 
way, a party appointed arbitrator may press the interests of said party without overstepping 
the limits of independence and impartiality. Naturally, said competence extends to familiar-
ity with the language chosen for the arbitration1111. 
 
2. Relations of the arbitrators with those involved in the arbitration process 
 
33. The ethical conduct of arbitrators prevents them from engaging in any kind of direct 
or indirect communication on matters related to the arbitration with any of the parties, the 
witnesses, the experts, or with other persons associated with or holding an interest in the 
dispute, without the presence of the other party. Should such communication be estab-
lished, the arbitrator must immediately inform the other party and the other arbitrators of all 
the details of the communication, under penalty of removal. Expressed differently, in the 
discharge of his duties, the arbitrator must relay to any of the parties the suggestions, pro-
posals or written documents submitted by the other party, and shall abstain from discussing 
or dealing with issues related to the arbitration, individually and in private, with one of the 
parties.  Furthermore, should it come to the notice of an arbitrator that another arbitrator 
has maintained wrongful contact with one of the parties, he can, and should, notify the 
other members of the arbitral tribunal, who will then decide what measures should be 
taken. 
Despite the fact that in this sense frequent mention is made of the aphorism “like Cae-
sar's wife, they must not only be virtuous but must appear to be virtuous”, it is obvious that 
no arbitrator can, directly or indirectly, accept favours, gifts or lavish hospitality from any 
                                                 
1109 Cf. P. Lalive, “Dérives arbitrales (I)”, Bloc. loc. cit., p. 590. 
1110 Ch.J. Moxley, “Selecting the Ideal Arbitrator”, Disp. Res. J., vol. 60, nº 3, 2005.  
1111 S.R. Bond, “The International Arbitrator: From the Perspective of the ICC International Court of Arbitra-
tion”, Nw. J. Int’l. L. & Bus., vol. 12, 1991, pp. 1 et seq. 
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party to the arbitration1112. This is why arbitrators must be particularly meticulous in avoid-
ing significant contact, be it social or professional, with any of the parties to the arbitration 
without the presence of the other party. After accepting appointment, and while serving as 
an arbitrator, a person should avoid entering into any business, professional or personal 
relationship, or acquiring any financial or personal interest which is likely to affect imparti-
ality or which might reasonably create the appearance of partiality. For a reasonable period 
of time after the decision of the case, persons who have served as arbitrators should avoid 
entering into any such relationship, or acquiring any such interest, in circumstances which 
might reasonablly create the appearance that they have been influenced in the arbitration by 
the anticipation or expectation of friendship or other interests (Canon I.C Code of Ethics 
AAA–ABA). 
 
34. Ethical codes include a series of rules applicable to the actions of arbitrators The lat-
ter should act with disinterest and deal with the parties impartially and fairly at each stage 
of the proceeding, which means being patient and polite to the parties, their lawyers and the 
witnesses. This fair treatment includes the requirement of not yielding to outside pressure, 
public opinion, fear of criticism or self-interest. It also includes not harassing the parties or 
other kinds of abuse or disturbance in the course of the hearing. A further requirement of 
conduct prevents arbitrators from communicating their decision to third parties before mak-
ing them known to the parties. If arbitration is paid and an arbitration service provider is 
not involved in remunerating arbitrators for their services, they must adhere to standards of 
integrity and fairness and scrupulously avoid entering into any kind of negotiation with the 
parties regarding said payment or engage in any kind of communication regarding said 
payments which could give the appearance of coercion. These requirements continue to 
apply after delivery of the award with respect to collaborating in the post-arbitration phase, 
particularly in the case of a party-appointed arbitrator who has voted in a particular way 
being charged with leading vacatur proceedings, or assisting in such a task. 
 
3. Confidentiality 
 
5.1. Scope 
 
35. Confidentiality is the requirement that arbitrators and parties not divulge the content 
of the proceedings, particularly documents produced during the same, including the arbitra-
tion award1113. Aside from very few systems, like that of Spain, which consider confidenti-
ality to be a legal requirement (Article 24.2 of the Spanish Arbitration Act), this require-
ment derives directly from the so-called “arbitration contract”1114 and extends to persons 
not connected with the processes (unless authorized by the arbitral tribunal), the parties, 
and to documents generated during the proceedings, which could include commercial or 
industrial secrets. To this effect, arbitration rules usually furnish arbitrators with instru-
                                                 
1112 A. Redfern and M. Hunter (with N. Blackaby and C. Partasides), op. cit., pp. 200-201. 
1113 See for a comprehensive review J.C. Fernández Rozas, “Trayectoria y contornos del mito de la confiden-
cialidad en el arbitraje comercial”, Arbitraje, vol. II, nº 2, 2009, pp. 335-378. 
1114 Th. Clay, L’arbitre, op. cit., p. 708. 
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ments to guarantee confidentiality, e.g., Article 20(7) ICC Rules. Its corollary, secrecy of 
proceedings, by itself usually justifies the parties´ desires to avoid potentially negative or 
damaging publicity, which is usually part and parcel of ordinary legal hearings1115.  
State laws are not unanimous with respect to the degree of confidentiality which should 
be held by those taking part in the arbitration. Some are silent on the issue while other raise 
arbitrators' duty to respect the confidentiality of their discussions1116. This individuality can 
be detrimental to the right to a fair hearing of one of the parties in the case of said party not 
foreseeing this circumstance, i.e., that national structures acknowledge an implicit require-
ment of confidentiality, or give different interpretations to the scope of confidentiality to be 
expected.   
This requirement can be enforced through two different channels. First, simply by ac-
cepting rules of arbitration which are very strict in this regard. Second, the parties them-
selves, or with the help of the arbitration panel, can reach an ad hoc agreement on confi-
dentiality specifying such issues as specific documentation or information which should 
remain confidential, the period of validity of this clause, measures applied to safeguard the 
confidentiality of the information or hearings, or the consequences of the non-disclosure 
requirement including liability and compensation to be paid for damages. The Uncitral 
Notes on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings (1996) specifies in some detail the elements of a 
“confidentiality agreement”: 
 
32. An agreement on confidentiality might cover, for example, one or more of the following matters: the 
material or information that is to be kept confidential (e.g. pieces of evidence, written and oral arguments, the 
fact that the arbitration is taking place, identity of the arbitrators, content of the award); measures for main-
taining confidentiality of such information and hearings; whether any special procedures should be employed 
for maintaining the confidentiality of information transmitted by electronic means (e.g. because communica-
tion equipment is shared by several users, or because electronic mail over public networks is considered not 
sufficiently protected against unauthorized access); circumstances in which confidential information may be 
disclosed in part or in whole (e.g. in the context of disclosures of information in the public domain, or if re-
quired by law or a regulatory body)”. 
 
Logically, the deliberations of the arbitration panel and the content of the award should 
remain confidential indefinitely, unless the parties release the arbitrators from this require-
ment. The arbitrator should not take part in any proceedings aimed at judging the award, nor 
should he disclose any information aimed at facilitating said judgement, unless he considers it 
his duty to disclose the incorrect or fraudulent conduct of any of his fellow arbitrators. Like-
wise, the option of the precautionary measure being taken by an arbitrator, as the person with 
the most information on the advisability of adopting the measure, being familiar with the 
main issue, and in a position to rapidly ascertain the best course of action, not only circum-
vents the inevitable delaying tactics being placed before the judge and significantly reduces 
the cost of the proceedings, but also preserves the principle of confidentiality1117.  
                                                 
1115 Y.L. Fortier, “The Occasionally Unwarranted Assumption of Confidentiality”, Arb. Int’l., vol. 15, 1999, 
pp. 131–130, esp. p. 131. 
1116 As was understood, interpreting Article 1469 NCPC, CA Rouen April 16, 1986, Rev. arb., 1988, pp. 327 
note M. de Boisséson. See J.P. Beraudo, “La confidentialité et le délibéré”, Les arbitres internationaux: Collo-
que du 4 fevrier 2005, Paris, 2005, pp. 101–123 
1117 J.C. Fernández Rozas, “Arbitraje y justicia cautelar”, RCEA, vol. XXII, 2007, pp. 44 y 49. 
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For all the above reasons, the confidentiality of arbitrators during their service is one of the 
essential principles of arbitration and is included in most arbitration rules and codes of ethics. 
 
36. Strictly speaking, the arbitrator should consider all aspects of the arbitration to be 
confidential. This means that he cannot give minutes of the arbitration hearing to third 
parties who are not part of the process. Neither can he use the information to which he has 
had access during the arbitration proceedings to obtain personal advantage or to the advan-
tage or disadvantage third parties. This requirement remains valid even after the dispute has 
been settled1118. 
In compliance with the rules of each arbitration service provider, certain awards passed 
down are open to the public, although the arbitrator may not publish them or make them 
known. This confidentiality requirement is applicable only to the arbitrator, not the parties. 
This should not be taken to mean that none of these provisions imposes a blanket of silence 
on the parties to the arbitration or prevents arbitrators from issuing confidentiality order 
concerning certain documents or information exchanged between the parties during the 
course of the proceedings. In the absence of an agreement or an order to the contrary, the 
parties are generally free to reveal the details of their own process as they deem fit, pro-
vided they do so by mutual agreement1119. Any documentary or other kind of proof submit-
ted by one party or witness to the arbitration must be considered confidential. Should such 
evidence contain information which is not public, no party having access to this informa-
tion as a result of their participation in the arbitration may use or divulge said information 
under any circumstances without the consent of the parties or unless ordered to do so by a 
competent court. 
 
5.2. Secrecy of deliberations 
 
37. The deliberations of the arbitrators are fundamental to arbitration proceedings1120 and 
in some systems are included in the concept of public policy1121. This rule is linked to an-
other which determines the secrecy of discussions. This premise has a long tradition in 
judicial practice1122 and has significant impact on arbitration. The premise in question has 
                                                 
1118 Code of Ethic AAA–ABA: “An arbitrator is in a relationship of trust to the parties and should not, at any 
time, use confidential information acquired during the arbitration proceeding to gain personal advantage or 
advantage for others, or to affect adversely the interest of another”; arbitrator “hould keep confidential all matters 
relating to the arbitration proceedings and decision. An arbitrator may obtain help from an associate, a research 
assistant or other persons in connection with reaching his or her decision if the arbitrator informs the parties of 
the use of such assistance and such persons agree to be bound” (canon VI). 
1119 J.B. Lee, “O princípio da confidencialidade na arbitragem comercial internacional”, O dereito 
internacional e o dereito brasileiro: homenagen a José Francisco Rezek, Ijuí, Univ. Unijui, 2004, pp. 732–740. 
1120 L.Y. Fortier, “The Tribunal’s Deliberations”, The Leading Arbitrators’ Guide to International Arbitra-
tion..., op. cit. (Chap. 22). 
1121 CA Paris, January 16, 2003 (Société des télécommunications internationales du Cameroun –Intelcam- / 
SA France Télécom), see supra note 72.This practice “garantie la nature juridictionnelle de la décision à la-
quelle parvient le tribunal arbitral, le principe de collégialité supposant que chaque arbitre ait la faculté de 
débattre de toute la décision avec les autres” (CA Paris, 1ère ch. C, November 27, 2008, SA GFI Informatique c. 
Sté Engineering Ingegneria Informatica SPA). 
1122 Y. Lécuyer, “Le secret du délibéré, les opinions séparées et la transparece”, Rev. trim. des droits de 
l’homme, vol. 15, nº 57, 2003, pp. 197-223. 
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two dimensions. On the one hand, it obliges arbitrators to hold their deliberations in pri-
vate, out of earshot of the parties and their lawyers, and on the other, it strictly prohibits 
divulgence at any future date of the content of these deliberations and the opinions main-
tained by other arbitrators. In the case of a multi-member arbitration panel, the arbitrator 
must not disclose the content of the deliberations to the other arbitrators who will take the 
final decision1123. This requirement can also be found in the IBA Rules of Ethics, which in 
Article 9 establish that the deliberations of the arbitral tribunal must remain confidential. 
The same is established, with some reservations, in Article 30.2 of the LCIA Rules.  
It is not possible here to describe the provisions regulating the secrecy of judge's delib-
erations in ordinary courts because arbitration is different and is not conditioned by the 
requirements inherent to judicial service regulated, in this regard, by Article 139 Spanish 
Procedural Law (2000), which establishes that “[t]he deliberations of multi-member courts 
are secret, as are the results of votes taken, notwithstanding the provisions of the law on 
revealing private votes”. Furthermore, there is another important differentiating element 
derived from the flexibility inherent in arbitration: the deliberations of the arbitrators do not 
have to comply with strict rules for the physical, and concurrent presence of the arbitrators 
in their debates. Such discussions may be conducted over the phone, by e-mail, telex or fax 
- this should not be confused with “oral discussions” 1124. This argument is strengthened by 
the fact that national and institutional rules determine the empowerment of the arbitrator to 
organise the proceedings. 
Another matter is if the arbitrator shows his disagreement in his dissenting opinion1125, or 
refuses to sign the award. Nevertheless, the relationship between private and secret vote con-
tinues to cause problems, to the point of considering that the mere existence of an opinion of 
this kind not only calls into question the efficacy of majority decisions and raises serious 
doubts regarding the independence and impartiality of the arbitrators when their vote benefits 
the pretentions of the parties appointing them1126, but is also a direct attack on the secrecy of 
arbitral deliberations1127. This is not the place to take sides in the debate on the merits and 
                                                 
1123 Sobre esta materia puede consultarse el interesante artículo de J. Paulsson y N Rawding, “The Trouble 
with Confidentility”, Arb. Int.’l, vol 11, 1995, nº 3, pp. 303 ss. 
1124 J.D. Bredin, “Le secret de délibéré arbitral”, Études offertes à Pierre Bellet, París, Litec, 1991, pp. 71-81 
(73). 
1125 En ciertos sistemas existen importantes reticencias frente a las opiniones disidentes en las decisiones ju-
diciales, pero tal reticencia no se extiende a la eventual anulación de los arbitral awards. En Francia e.g. se consi-
dera que “l’existence d’une opinion dissidente en l’espèce n’est pas de nature à heurter la conception française 
de l’ordre public international dès lors que le principe de la collégialité du délibéré a bien été respecté” (CA 
Paris, 1ère Ch. C, de 7 de october de 2008: SAS Merial / Klocke Verpackung-Service GMBH). Debe recordarse 
que en determinados círculos arbitrales las opiniones disidentes registran una valoración muy negativa. See por 
todos, L. Levy, “Dissenting Oppinions in International Arbitration in Switzerland”, Arb. Int’l, vol. 5, 1989, pp. 
35-42; J.-F. Poudret and S. Besson, Droit comparé de l’arbitrage commercial international, Schulthess, 2003; 
J.-F. Poudret, “Légitimité et opportunité de l’opinion dissidente dans le silence de la loi? Poursuite d’un debat 
amical”, Liber amicorum Claude Reymond: autour d’arbitrage, Paris, Litec, 2004, pp. 243-254.. 
1126 A. Redfern, “Dissenting Opinions in International Commercial Arbitration: the Good, the Bad and the 
Ugly”, Arbitration Insights : twenty Years of the Annual Lecture of the School of International Arbitration 
(J.D.M. Lew and L.A. Mistelis, eds.), Alphen ann den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2007, pp. 367-392. 
1127 J.D. Bredin, “Retour au délibéré arbitral”, Liber amicorum Claude Reymond: autour d’arbitrage, Paris, 
Litec, 2004, pp.43-51; H. Smit, “Dissenting Oppinions in Arbitration”, Bull. CIArb. CCI / ICC ICArb. Bull., vol. 
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scope of the dissenting opinion in arbitration, although it should be emphasised that it is not a 
breach of the principle of confidentiality if the same does not reveal details of the discussions 
held between the arbitrators prior to drawing up the arbitral award1128. 
 
 
IV. EFFECT ON THE ARBITRAL AWARD OF A VIOLATION OF ETHICAL VALUES 
 
1. Breach of the requirement of transparency 
 
38. The appearance of partiality can be taken as grounds for vacatur if the arbitrator has 
failed in his duty to disclose, and said grounds are further reinforced if his partiality has 
been reliably shown. The Uncitral Model Law (1985) does not discuss this individually, 
and although it is not infrequently found in some national systems it could be added both to 
the grounds of manifest impairment of the right to a fair hearing because, for example, if 
the arbitrators ignore their duty to disclose the circumstances which have given rise to justi-
fied doubts regarding their impartiality or independence they are violating the minimum 
rule of due process, specifically the principle of equality, and the public policy exception. 
This basis for opposing an award arises when circumstances are discovered concerning the 
arbitrators which at the time could have been used as grounds to challenge and which were 
not known by the parties during the arbitration because the persons involved did not dis-
close them in their statement of independence. This practice is quite varied and we fre-
quently come across it when there is a professional relationship between the arbitrator and 
the representatives of one of the parties. A good example of this can be found in Spanish 
jurisprudence in the Ruling of the Provincial Court of Navarre of 21 February 2000, which 
accepted the application to vacate on the grounds that the essential guarantees of the pro-
ceedings had been breached: 
 
“[I]n the light of the profession relationship which must be assumed from the fact that the lawyer of 
one of the parties and the lawyer appointed as arbitrator in said process have worked in the same law 
firm for more than 6 years at least, a circumstance which does not allow the arbitrator to be objective, 
at least to guarantee that her decision commands the required confidence of third parties and the parties 
in the sense that it is the result of a fully committed and impartial decision”1129. 
 
The above case involves the arbitrator's neglect to inform the parties previously of 
the basic elements or arbitration service: independence, impartiality and availability.  
 
39. In the U.S.A., Article 10(2) of the Federal Arbitration Act (1925) provides fertile 
ground for the argument that an arbitrator's failure to disclose certain information may 
require the award to be vacated. Jurisprudence is firm on this point, as illustrated in Com-
monwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental. Although the objecting party had not been dam-
aged in any way by the arbitrator’s failure to inform, the court set the precedent that al-
                                                                                                                                  
15, nº 1, 2004, pp. 37-41; P.J. Rees and P. Rohn, “Dissentign Opinions Can They Fulfil a Beneficial Role?”, 
Arb. Int’l., vol. 25, nº 3, 2009, pp. 329-346. 
1128 G. Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2nd éd., Alphen ann den Rijn, Kluwer Law Internatio-
nal, 2009, pp. 2467 et seq. 
1129 JUR 2000\113772. 
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though arbitrators are independent and impartial, failure to comply strictly with the re-
quirement to disclose will result in the award being vacated. A federal district court in 
Texas examined the “evident partiality” standard and noted: “In a failure to disclose case, 
the integrity of the process by which arbitrators are chosen is at issue; in an actual bias 
case, the integrity of the arbitrator's decision is at issue. . . . Thus, the standard a court uses 
to evaluate a claim of evident partiality varies depending on whether the parties seeking to 
vacate the award argue non–disclosure or actual bias”1130. Furthermore, in New Regency 
Productions, Inc. / Nippon Herald Films, Inc., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated 
an award given by an arbitrator who had not disclosed his work negotiations and subse-
quent acquisition of a job with a subsidiary of one of the companies involved in the dispute 
while he was acting as an arbitrator1131.  
 
40. French jurisprudence has a long tradition confirming the effect of the statute on arbi-
tral awards. The Court of Cassation expressly stated that “l’ignorance par l’une des parties 
d’une circonstance de nature à porter atteinte à cette qualité vicie le consentement donné 
par elle à la convention d'arbitrage et en entraîne la nullité”1132. In the Judgement of the 
Tribunal de Grande Instance de París (1re Ch., 1re Sect.) May 12, 1993 (Société Raoul Du-
val / V.)1133 the chairman of the arbitral tribunal started working for one of the parties the 
day after the award was rendered and failed to disclose this fact to the parties. The same 
statute was adopted in the judgement of the Paris Court of Appeal (1re Ch. Civ.) June, 30, 
1995 (B / Société Annahold BV et autres)1134 and by the judgement of the Paris Court of 
Appeal (1re Ch.c) of November 30, 1999 (Marteau / CIGP) due to the fact that the arbitra-
tor had not at any time disclosed that he belonged to a law firm with professional and eco-
nomic links to companies belonging to the group of the body appointing him1135. More-
over, the Court of Cassation (2ème Ch. Civ.) December 6, 2001 (Fremarc / ITM Entre-
prises) even vacated a judgement passed by the Paris Court of Appeal in relation to an 
arbitrator and lecturer in law who had the unseemly ability of systematically managing to 
be appointed by the same type of party and in the same kind of arbitration, and who had 
neglected to disclose this circumstance. The Court of Appeal1136 considered that this atti-
tude, while reprehensible, was not significant enough to show a lack of independence and 
impartiality, and much less to justify vacating the award. Nevertheless, this transfer was 
vacated on the grounds of contradiction, which led to vacating the award in spite of the fact 
that failure to disclose was not included in the grounds of Article 1484 NCPC. French law 
has debated this practice, considering that it grants autonomy to non-regulated grounds for 
vacating and that failure to disclose should be added to the general grounds for incorrect 
composition of the arbitral tribunal; nevertheless, this position has not been unanimous, 
                                                 
1130 Weber v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 2006 WL 2583183 (N.D.Tex Sept. 1, 2006). 
1131 United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit September 4, 2007, Arbitraje, vol. I, nº 1, 2008, pp. 265 ss note E. 
Artuch Iriberri; C.T. Salomon y Q.C. Smith, “Arbitrators Have Duty to Investigate Possible Conflicts Arising from New 
Employment”, DLA Piper, 5 November 2007, http://www.dlapiper.com/arbitrators_have_duty_to_investigate/. 
1132 Ury / Galeries Lafayette, see supra 
1133 Rev. arb., 1996, pp. 411-418; corfirmed by Paris Court of Appeal October 12, 1995, ibid., 1999, pp. 324 
ss, and Cass. civ., December 16, 1997, ibid., 1999, pp. 253 ss. 
1134 Ibid., 1996, pp. 496-502. 
1135 Rev. arb., 2000, pp. 299 et seq. note Ph. Grandjean. 
1136 CA Paris, October 28, 1999, Rev. arb., pp. 299 et seq. note Ph. Grandjean. 
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pointing out that the vacating judge should sanction not the mere existence of a risk (due to 
incomplete disclosure), but the actual act of non-disclosure1137. 
 
41. In Finland, Arbitration Act 967/1992 (amendments up to 460/1999 included) 
sets strict standards for the independence and impartiality of all arbitrators, even party-
nominated arbitrators, and aims at the protection of the arbitral proceedings. The act 
stipulates that an arbitrator must be impartial and independent. This is because the of-
fice is comparable with that of a judge. Under no circumstances is the arbitrator to 
function as an advocate or attorney for the nominating party. To secure that this re-
quirement is met, an arbitrator is obliged to disclose any circumstances that are likely 
to compromise his or her impartiality or independence. If there is any reasonable doubt 
to this, an arbitrator should not assume the duties unless the parties are aware of these 
and explicitly consent to his or her appointment. In Urho, Sirkka and Jukka Ruola / 
Professor X the plaintiff had successfully annulled the arbitral award in a prior action 
in which he challenged the award on the ground of bias. In this subsequent action be-
fore the Finnish Supreme Court, the plaintiff sued the arbitrator directly for the cost 
and expenses of the arbitration. The arbitrator had failed to disclose the fact that he had 
given several legal opinions to the defendant company and financial institutions who 
were intervening parties in the arbitration. The Finnish Supreme Court held that the 
arbitrator’s non disclosure constituted a breach of contract and awarded the plaintiff the 
cost and expenses of the arbitration1138. 
 
2. Violation of the requirement of confidentiality 
 
42. In order to guarantee the effectiveness of commercial arbitration there must be ample 
public confidence in the integrity and justice of the process, because arbitration is not based 
exclusively on confidence but also on legal safety1139. The requirement of responsibility 
implies, from this point of view, a guarantee by which the parties ensure that the arbitrators 
discharge the duty of judging which has been taken away from judges. This is the main 
statute governing the sector. As a general rule, violations of the requirement of confidenti-
ality by one or more arbitrators does not affect the validity of the arbitral award and com-
parative jurisprudence considers that this circumstance cannot be included in the grounds 
supporting vacatur.  
French jurisprudence, before entry into force of the NCPN, was not in favour of admit-
ting such drastic consequences. With respect to the judgement of the Paris Court of Appeal  
(1ère Ch. suppl.) March 11, 1981 (Daniel Barre / Société los Solidaires), it stated that as a 
general rule the premise of secrecy of deliberations is imposed equally on arbitrators and 
judges, but “sa violation n’est pas sanctionnée par la nullité, qui serait d’ailleurs danger-
euse en matière d’arbitrage”1140. This approach was maintained after the reform, as can be 
seen in the judgement of the Paris Court of Appeal (1ère Ch. C) October 7, 2008 (SAS 
                                                 
1137 Rev. arb., 2003, pp. 1231 et seq. and note de E. Gaillard. 
1138 Finnish Supreme Court, nº 2005: 14, 31 January, 2005, Int’l Disp. Res., vol. 18, nº 1, 2995, pp. 4-6. 
1139 S. Riegler, “Arbitrators’ Liability”, Austrian Arbitration Yearb., 2007, pp. 105–124. 
1140 Rev. arb., 1982, pp. 84–90 note J. Viatte. 
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Merial / Klocke Verpackung–Service GMBH) which reiterates that violations of the secrecy 
of deliberations do not provide grounds for vacating arbitral awards. The Court concluded 
that the claimant was therefore prevented from arguing that the arbitral tribunal had vio-
lated its right to due process and failed to comply with the arbitration agreement and terms 
of reference1141. 
This drastic attitude in favor of vacatur should be contrasted with the current trend ob-
served in certain legal systems to widen the scope of the grounds for vacating the award. 
Undoubtedly, if violations of secrecy adversely affect the right to a fair hearing of one of 
the parties – Article 41(1) (b) Spanish Arbitration Act – this circumstance could prosper, 
above all in Spanish law, which includes the requirement of confidentiality in Article 24, 
which accepts the principles of hearing, equality and contradiction. Greater difficulty 
would be had by the public policy ground - Article 41(1) (f) - as the scope of this basis for 
setting aside an arbitral award before state courts is limited and must be interpreted restric-
tively, justifying violation of fundamental public rights and freedom guaranteed under the 
constitution, both with regard to legal guarantees and essential procedural guarantees and 
principles. 
 
 
V. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
43. Arbitrators are under a number of obligations rooted in the ethical framework of 
arbitration. The most essential are competence and diligence, confidentiality, and du-
ties in relation to parallel and subsequent proceedings. Likewise, the appointed arbitra-
tor undertakes to be neutral, available, and at the same time, to discharge his duty with 
diligence. The first involves impartiality and independence: partiality occurs when an 
arbitrator favors one of the parties, or when he shows himself to be predisposed to-
wards certain aspects of the issue in dispute. Dependence stems from the relationship 
between the arbitrator and one of the parties or a person closely linked to the latter. The 
second involves the arbitrators devoting the time and attention reasonably demanded 
by the parties, depending on the circumstances of the case, directing his efforts at con-
ducting the arbitration in such a way as to prevent costs from rising irrationally with 
respect to the issue in dispute. It also means that arbitrators must conduct themselves 
equally as to all parties, not yielding to outside pressure, public opinion, fear of criti-
cism or self-interest. It makes no sense that some rules of arbitration, recognized in 
international practice, neglect to pay sufficient attention to the above extremes and 
simply insist on the need for arbitral independence, relegating principles of impartiality 
and availability to ethical codes, whose content is much more effective. 
Arbitration requires a neutral and impartial climate, one in which the parties may 
conduct themselves in complete freedom and with the total confidence that their posi-
tions will receive a fair hearing. However, these elements can only be achieved if all 
doubt regarding the integrity of the arbitrators has been dispelled. Confidence in arbi-
                                                 
1141 Rev. arb., 2009, pp. 352, nota Betto y Canivet. See Ch. von Krause, “Paris Court of Appeal Confirms 
Importance of Estoppel in International Arbitration”, http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2009/02/25/paris-
court-of-appeal-confirms-importance-of-estoppel-in-international-arbitration/#more-364. 
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trators increases from the moment they admit that respect for certain professional ethi-
cal standards is a normal attitude. An arbitration service which has fully and unreserv-
edly accepted a code of ethics is an essential element in three respects: (1) professional 
prestige of arbitrators themselves, (2) that of the arbitration service provider which 
may have intervened in their appointment and, (3) the future of arbitration itself in a 
particular country which aims to become an efficient centre of international arbitration. 
For this reason these codes should not minimize the content concerning comparative 
standards for arbitrators which can be gleaned from established arbitral tools such as 
the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, or the AAA–
ABA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes. 
It is one thing to assume the honor, availability, impartiality, readiness and inde-
pendence of an arbitrator's actions and another to suppose that in principle (armor-
plating arbitrators) that these precepts can be violated during the arbitration proceed-
ings. For this reason it is essential to have an effective system with which to control 
respect for arbitral ethics and correct many irregularities seen in recent arbitration prac-
tices described here. Said attitude of defending the required legal safety of the parties, 
far from calling into doubt the important role played by arbitration in modern society, 
will strengthen its viability and confirm its future. 
